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VOLUME 55 SUMMER 1990 NUMBER 3
A REMEDY FOR THE "EXTREME CASE:"
THE STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AFTER CROSON
Leland Ware*
After the Supreme Court decided City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,1 a commentator responded with the following analogy:
The White Team and the Black Team are playing the last
football game of the season. The White Team owns the
stadium, owns the referees and has been allowed to field
nine times as many players. For almost four quarters, the
White Team has cheated on every play and, as a conse-
quence, the score is White Team 140, Black Team 3. Only
10 seconds remain in the game, but as the White quarter-
back huddles with his team before the final play, a light
suddenly shines from his eyes. "So how about it, boys?" he
asks his men. "What do you say from here on we play
fair?"2
This reaction reflects the shock and disappointment that reverber-
ated throughout the Civil Rights community at the conclusion of the
Supreme Court's 1988-1989 term. An examination of the actual
decisions indicates, however, that they are not entirely the radical
* Assistant Professor, St. Louis University School of Law. B.A.
Fisk University 1970; J.D. Boston College Law School 1973.
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) [hereinafter Croson].
2. Ward, Whites: 140, Blacks: 3, N.Y. Times, February 17, 1989, at 29, col.
1. Andrew Ward's commentaries are heard on "All Things Considered,"
broadcast by the National Public Radio.
1
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departures from precedent that many of the press reports had suggest-
ed. Though disappointing to some, the cases merely fine-tuned existing
legal doctrine and reflect the approach of what appears to be an
emerging conservative majority.8 There are, however, some broad
implications for equal protection jurisprudence.
In Croson, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance which
required thirty percent of the city's construction contracts to be reserved
for minority contractors. The Court found that the ordinance discrimi-
nated against non-minority contractors in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The decision in Croson
represents the culmination of an ideological struggle that has waged
within the Court for more than ten years. Prior to Croson, a majority
of the Justices had agreed that race-conscious remedial efforts are
constitutionally permissible, but could not agree to the applicable
analytical framework for testing the validity of such measures.
One group argued that unlike classifications used to disadvantage
minorities, racial classifications which are employed to remedy the
lingering effects of discriminatory practices should not be judged by the
same standard that is used to review classifications which operate to the
detriment of minorities. Another group contended that any racial
classification is inherently suspect and cannot be justified in the absence
of a compelling justification. Furthermore, even where a compelling
justification is shown, the latter group maintained that the classification
must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goals of the legislation.
In the statutory context, one faction of the Court has taken the
position that the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act do not prohibit employers from developing race-conscious
hiring and promotion criteria, as long as the employer has ample reason
to believe that minority candidates were denied equal employment
opportunities. The opposing faction has countered that Title VII forbids
employers from considering an applicant's race or sex when making any
personnel decisions.
The Croson decision ended the constitutional standoff when a
majority of the Justices agreed, for the first time, to apply the strict
scrutiny standard to an affirmative action program. When state action
is involved, affirmative action must now be justified by a compelling
state interest, and the means chosen to effectuate that interest must be
narrowly tailored to achieving the state's goals. Although the opinion
does not completely condemn race-conscious efforts designed to
3. In addition to the Reagan appointees, this majority includes Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and White. Dissenting in Croson were Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun.
4. See infra notes 233-331 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion
of the Croson decision.
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2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
eliminate the effects of discrimination against minorities, efforts to do
so will now be far more difficult. Further, although Croson did not
address affirmative action programs developed by private entities, the
implications extend far beyond the context of government contracts, in
which this case arose.
This article will examine the Supreme Court decisions which
address the validity of affirmative action programs. Beginning with
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,5 the Court has
reviewed affirmative action in three separate areas: educational
programs, government procurement, and employment disputes. In cases
presenting employment issues, the Court has considered voluntary
affirmative action programs, court-ordered affirmative action, and
programs which resulted from negotiated consent decrees. Although
Croson has resolved the conflict over whether strict scrutiny applies, it
remains unclear what strict scrutiny will mean in this context. It
appears that there is a compelling state interest in eliminating the
vestiges of discrimination, but it is not certain that classifications can
be narrowly drawn to achieving this goal.
Prior to Croson, at least one Justice served as a moderating
influence between the competing factions. In light of recent changes
within the Court, it remains to be seen whether moderation will prevail
in the future. Some commentators will no doubt predict that Croson
marks the demise of affirmative action. Others will argue that the level
of judicial review will be more exacting, but that carefully crafted
programs will survive.6 This article suggests that if racial discrimina-
tion is as isolated and sporadic as some believe, race-conscious remedies
cannot be justified and will not withstand the strict scrutiny standard.
On the other hand, if racial discrimination is as pervasive and en-
trenched as others believe, race-conscious remedies are a necessary
means of redressing discriminatory practices.
7
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. The level of debate regarding affirmative action after Croson shows no
sign of lessening; consider Joint Statement: Constitutional Scholars' Statement
on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J.
1711 (1990); Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.:
A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Scholars' Reply
to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163 (1989).
7. The concept of strict scrutiny in this context can be traced to the judicial
function of protection of constitutional rights for those groups that may be least
able to demand protection; as stated in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938): "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
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I. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke8
The first affirmative action case to reach the Supreme Court
involved affirmative action in higher education. Although the Court
struck down the plan employed by the University of California, a
majority of the Justices endorsed the legality of affirmative action. The
Justices could not agree, however, to the applicable standard of
constitutional scrutiny. In Bakke, the Court considered a challenge to
a program which reserved a specified number of positions in a medical
school's entering class for minority students.
The plaintiff, Allan Bakke, was a white male whose 1973 and 1974
applications to the medical school had been rejected. During the same
years, minority applicants whose grades, test scores, and ratings were
lower than Bakke's were admitted under the Special Admissions
program. After the rejection of his second application, Bakke filed a
civil action in the Superior Court of California which claimed that the
University's admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and art.
I, section 21 of the California Constitution.9
The Supreme Court assumed, without expressly deciding, that Title
VI created a private right of action.'0 The Court also held that Title
VI proscribed racial classifications that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the fifth amendment. Although a majority of the
Justices agreed to a decision in Bakke's favor, they were unable to agree
on the underlying rationale ." One group of Justices believed that
affirmative action was permissible and should not have been subjected
to the strict scrutiny standard.12 Another group disagreed and argued
that any form of race-conscious state action violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 A third view which
declined to adopt either of the two extremes is reflected in the opinion
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Bakke].
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278.
10. Id. at 284. The Court's assumption, "only for the purposes of this case",
resulted from its hesitancy to review or resolve a question which was "neither
argued nor decided in either of the courts below." Id. at 283-84.
11. Justice Powell's opinion was joined in part by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, who also issued a joint opinion, while separate
opinions were authored by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun; additional-
ly, an opinion by Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
12. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun.
13. Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.
[Vol. 55
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A. Justice Powell's Opinion
One of the most important disputes in Bakke focused on the level
of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the special admissions program. The
University contended that the strict scrutiny standard applied only to
classifications that disadvantaged "discrete and insular minorities."'
15
Bakke, in contrast, argued that the strict scrutiny standard applied to
any racial classification. Rejecting the University's position, Justice
Powell found that "[tihe guarantee of Equal Protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color."'" Based on this reasoning, Justice Powell
concluded that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherent-
ly suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial scrutiny."'17
The University also argued that the strict scrutiny standard should
not apply when the discriminatory conduct is directed towards the white
majority and has a "benign purpose.""8 This argument was rejected
based on Justice Powell's perception of the difficulties that would arise
with the application of varying levels of judicial review to what he
termed "fluid" concepts of ethnicity. 9 Justice Powell also stressed his
view that the right to equal protection is a "personal one."'  Therefore,
individuals, rather than groups, are entitled to protection from
stigmatizing racial classifications.
To support its contention that benign classifications were permissi-
ble, the University pointed to several school desegregation and
employment and sex discrimination cases which it believed justified the
14. Justice Powell's opinion was joined in minor part by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who also issued a joint opinion concurring in
the judgement in part and dissenting in part.
15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
16. Id. at 289-90.
17. Id. at 291.
18. Id. at 294.
19. Id. at 298. Justice Powell noted three difficulties: (1) a "benign
preference" cannot simply be taken at face value, i.e., that it is, in fact, truly
"benign"; (2) preferential programs may reinforce stereotypes (a statement seen
in later cases); and (3) to force innocents to bear the burden of redressing
grievances is inequitable. Id.
20. Id at 288, 289. Justice Powell relied on the explicit language of the
fourteenth amendment, as well as those hallmark cases expounding on same,
including Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Id.
1990]
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special consideration that it had given to minority students.2 ' In these
cases, the Court had approved race-conscious remedies. Justice Powell
disagreed and distinguished the cases because they all involved
remedies which were imposed after proving violations of law. In this
case, however, there had been no formal determination that the
University had ever engaged in any discriminatory practices.
22
Justice Powell also found that under the University's admissions
program, designated minority groups were preferred at the expense of
other groups. As a consequence, Justice Powell concluded that the
University's admissions process created a racial classification which
could not be sustained in the absence of a compelling justification. 23
Turning to the University's proffered justifications, the Court noted
that the admissions program was intended to reduce the deficit of
minority students enrolled in medical school; to counter the effects of
past societal discrimination; to increase the number of physicians who
practice in underserved communities; and to secure the educational
benefits that would flow from an ethnically diverse student body.'
Justice Powell recognized California's legitimate interest in
eliminating the effects of past discrimination but disapproved of
classifications that aided "persons perceived as members of relatively
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent victims."'  In
Justice Powell's view, societal discrimination was not by itself an
adequate justification for race-conscious remediation because discrimi-
nation of this sort "[is] an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach to the past."'2  Furthermore, in the absence of
formally identified acts of discrimination, remediation of the type
established by the University could not be constitutionally permissible
21. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300-02. School desegregation cases cited by
petitioner included Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971), McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971) and Green v. County School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430 (1968); employment discrimination cases included Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); and gender discrimination cases cited
were Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
22. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301. Although "there was no judicial determination
of constitutional violation as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial
classification", Justice Powell did note that "[a]lthough disadvantaged whites
applied to the special program in large numbers .... none received an offer of
admission through that process." Id. at 276.
23. Id. at 320.
24. Id. at 307-15.
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because it denied tangible benefits to innocent bystanders.' The goal
of improving health care services to underserved communities was
dismissed almost summarily, because the University had conceded that
there was no assurance that its minority graduates would practice in
underserved communities.28
Although he disapproved of the means that the University
employed, Justice Powell found that the University's goal of attaining
student body diversity was "clearly... constitutionally permissible."'
Relying on the principle of academic freedom, Justice Powell agreed
with the University's assertion that diversity enhances the atmosphere
needed to foster the educational process.
After finding that the state's interest in student diversity was
sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest requirement, Justice Powell
focused on the question of whether the special admissions program was
narrowly tailored to achieving its goal. He found that the University's
practice of reserving a specified number of seats for minority students
would actually hinder its goal of achieving genuine diversity because
several potential students were totally excluded from consideration.
°
Citing with approval the Harvard College program, Justice Powell
concluded that race could legitimately be a "plus factor" in the search
for ethnic diversity, but an approach which isolates minorities from any
sort of comparison to other groups operated to deprive non-minority
candidates of fair consideration.31 Justice Powell stressed that each
applicant should be treated as an individual and that each applicant
was entitled to a fair assessment. Consideration of race or ethnicity is
permissible, but such an approach could not legitimately operate as an
27. Id. at 307-09. The Court stated:
We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived
as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other
innocent individuals, in the absence of judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations....
Without such findings of constitutional or statutory violations, it
cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in
helping one individual than in refraining from harming another.
Id& at 307.
28. Id. at 310-11.
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id. at 319.
31. Id. at 317. Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford Universities and the
University of Pennsylvania had supplied briefs to the Court as Amic! Curiae;
attached to Justice Powell's opinion was the Harvard College Admissions
Program Plan, a "constitutional" admissions criteria with race and ethnicity as
a factor in helping to determine admission. The reader is advised that at this
reading, approximately twelve years after the Bakke decision, the "Harvard
Plan" may appear quaintly self-serving.
1990]
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absolute bar to the consideration of non-minority candidates.3 2 Based
on this analysis, Justice Powell concluded that the University's
admissions program violated Title VI because it was not narrowly
tailored to achieving the goal of student diversity.
B. Justice Brennan's Opinion
Justice Brennan partly concurred and partly dissented with Justice
Powell's opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall
and Blackmun,' believed that the Medical School's affirmative action
program was constitutionally permissible. Specifically, Justice Brennan
found that Title VI does not bar preferential treatment of racial
minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the
extent that such action is consistent with the fourteenth amendment.34
In Justice Brennan's view, Bakke's claim-that Title VI prohibited
affirmative action programs-was not supported by the legislative
history of the statute. Justice Brennan found that "no decision of this
Court has ever adopted the position that the Constitution must be
colorblind."' In addition, Justice Brennan deemed it "inconceivable"
that Congress would endorse voluntary compliance with the anti-
discrimination provisions of Title VI "while at the same time forbidding
the voluntary use of race-conscious remedies to cure acknowledged or
obvious statutory violations."' In response to Bakke's claim that
racial criteria are prohibited by the plain language of Title VI, Justice
Brennan answered that this argument was not supported by the
remedial purpose of Title VI or its legislative history." With regard
32. Id. at 318. In a footnote, Justice Powell noted that fellow Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun failed to address (in their separate
opinions) that "the denial to respondent of this right to individualized consider-
ation without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special
admissions program." Id. at 318 n.52.
33. Id. at 324. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist
believed that the admissions program violated Title VI. Id at 325.
34. Id. at 325.
35. Id. at 336.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 328. According to Justice Brennan,
Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies; it
does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means
of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent such action is
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [Neither the
legislative history of Title VI nor other sources] lends support to the
proposition that Congress intended to bar all race-conscious efforts to
extend the benefits of federally financed programs to minorities who
[Vol. 55
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to the degree of scrutiny required by the fourteenth amendment,
Brennan suggested a level somewhere between the traditional strict
scrutiny standard and the "reasonably related" standard which is used
when a suspect category is not employed.' Under this intermediate
standard, "racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantial-
ly related to the achievement of those objectives."'3 9 The opinion went
on to recognize the potential for misuse and stigmatization under this
relaxed standard. It concluded, however, that a strict and searching
review of legislative classifications under an intermediate standard
would serve as an adequate check against abuse.
40
Disagreeing with Justice Powell, Justice Brennan believed that the
goal of remedying the present effects of past societal discrimination was
sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious remedial
programs as long as there was a substantial basis for concluding that
barriers created by past discrimination interfered with the present
ability of minority students to gain access to educational programs.
41
Justice Brennan also contended that beneficiaries of affirmative action
programs did not need to prove that they were actual victims of
discrimination. In his view, "[s]uch relief does not require as a
predicate proof that recipients of preferential advancement have been
individually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is
within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of
discrimination.1
42
Justice Brennan argued that Justice Powell's approach of condition-
ing remedial action on a formal finding of discrimination would operate
to undermine the goal of voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination
laws. Institutions would be reluctant to admit to discriminatory
practices or gather evidence which could be used in proceedings against
them. As a consequence, Justice Brennan found that "a state govern-
ment may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such
have been historically excluded from the full benefits of American life.
Id.
38. Id. at 356. Strict scrutiny, "that inexact term", is "define[d] with
precision" and is further described as follows: "a government practice or statute
which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications'
is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive
alternative is available." Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
40. Id. at 363-65.
41. Id. at 362-63.
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programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might
otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate
impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or
that of society at large."
43
Beyond a general endorsement of the concept by a majority of the
Justices, Bakke had little impact on the legal status of affirmative
action. In fact, the standard for reviewing constitutional challenges to
remedial classifications was left in a state of confusion. One group of
Justices believed that race-conscious state action was a permissible
remedial measure and should not be subjected to strict scrutiny when
the classification is employed to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimi-
nation. Another faction argued that all classifications were suspect
regardless of whether they were employed to disadvantage or to assist
racial minorities. In a view which reflects a compromise between the
two extremes, Justice Powell asserted that race-conscious remedies
could not be utilized in the absence of a compelling justification, but
could be used as a plus factor in a multifaceted selection process when
the goal desired was student body diversity. This debate continued in
subsequent cases and remained unresolved for several years following
Bakke. As the analysis of the various opinions indicates, Bakke decided
very little beyond rejecting the use of a fixed quota in an admissions
program. Affirmative action was seemingly endorsed but the appropri-
ate analytical approach was far from clear.
43. Id. at 369. Justice Stevens authored a separate opinion which was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. This opinion concurred
in the Court's judgment to the extent it affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California, but it otherwise dissented. Id. at 421. Justice Stevens
believed that the decision of the California Supreme Court did not resolve the
question of whether race or color could ever be used as a factor in an admissions
program. Id. at 410-11. For this reason, much of the analysis of the Powell and
Brennan opinions was, in his view, unnecessary. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens
believed that the University had violated the plain language of Title VI based
on his conclusion that the University had excluded Bakke from medical school
solely because of his race. Id. at 421. According to Justice Stevens, Title VI
prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from excluding "any"
individual from a federally-funded program "on the ground of race." Id. at 413.
To support his conclusion, Justice Stevens relied on the language of the statute
and various passages in the legislative history of Title VI in which its propo-
nents "gave repeated assurances that the Act would be 'colorblind' in applica-
tion." Id. at 415. As a consequence, Justice Stevens believed that the judgment
of the California Supreme should have been affirmed and that the other Justices
should not have addressed the question of the continued validity of affirmative
action programs. Id. at 411, 421.
640 [Vol. 55
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The bulk of the Supreme Court's affirmative action cases have
arisen in the context of employment disputes. This group of cases
includes voluntary affirmative action programs, court-ordered programs,
and programs resulting from consent decrees. With regard to hiring
decisions, the Court held in one of its earliest decisions that an
employer's voluntary affirmative action program, which designated a
specified number of training positions for black employees, did not
violate Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment.4
Several years later, the Court affirmed its approval of voluntary
programs when it held that race or sex could be legitimately used as a
plus factor in a multifaceted promotion process.45
Race-conscious hiring has also been endorsed as a judicial remedy
for discriminatory selection practices. In one case, the Supreme Court
sustained a lower court's decision which required a labor union and an
apprenticeship program to hire specific percentages of minority workers
after the defendants were found guilty of engaging in discriminatory
selection practices and repeatedly failed to comply with orders requiring
them to abandon their unlawful conduct.46 The Supreme Court also
approved negotiated consent decrees which included numerical hiring
and promotional goals that benefitted minority workers who were not
themselves the proven victims of discriminatory conduct.
47
In the case of layoffs, however, the Court has consistently held that
affirmative action efforts cannot be invoked as a justification for the
displacement of incumbent non-minority workers. In one case, the
Court held that a consent decree which created temporary hiring and
promotion preferences for minority employees but which did not address
layoff procedures, could not be construed to require the retention of
minority workers at a time when non-minority employees were being
laid off.4" In a subsequent decision, the Court struck down a collective
bargaining agreement which required the retention of probationary
minority teachers when tenured non-minority teachers were being laid
off.49 The analysis of these decisions is considered in greater detail in
the following sections of this article.
44. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
45. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
46. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986).
47. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501 (1986).
48. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
49. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
1990]
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A. Voluntary Affirmative Action Programs
1. Steelworkers of America v. Weber
a. Majority Opinion
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,6° the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to the validity of an affinmative action plan
adopted by Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. In 1974,
Kaiser and the Steelworkers Union executed a collective bargaining
agreement which created a training program and reserved fifty percent
of the program's positions for black employees. The program was
designed to eliminate substantial racial imbalances in Kaiser's skilled
craft positions which resulted from a long-standing history of discrimi-
natory practices.
51
After implementation of the plan, a white production employee,
Brian Weber, filed a civil action challenging the legality of the program.
After a trial, the district court held that the plan violated Title VII
because it required Kaiser to make hiring decisions on the basis of an
applicant's race.
52
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Weber argued that the
provisions of Title VII which make it unlawful for employers to
"discriminate... because of... race" prohibited race-conscious hiring
programs. The Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion authored by
Justice Brennan, it held that Title VII allows "affirmative action plans
designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories."' Relying on the legislative history of Title
VII and the congressional goal of achieving racial integration in the
workplace, the opinion concluded that Congress could not have
50. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) [hereinafter Weber].
51. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-99. Kaiser's skilled craft positions (electricians,
pipefitters, sheetmetal workers) were essentially the domain of the white male
workforce; the Gramercy, Louisiana plant had less than 2% black skilled
tradesmen. Kaiser's plan set out to increase this number to approximate the
percentage of blacks in the labor pool. Kaiser would provide on-the-job training
to unskilled workers to meet this quota; 50/0 of these openings were reserved for
black employees. Id. at 198.
52. Id. at 200. The complaint as framed in the lower court was that the
plan, by allocating 50% of the openings to minority unskilled labor, allowed
blacks with less seniority to receive the on-the-job training in lieu of white
unskilled laborers with greater seniority. Id. at 199-200. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision. Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
[Vol. 55
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
"intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to
accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve." 4
The Court found additional support in the legislative history of
Title VII. During the debates which preceded the enactment of the
statute, opponents claimed that the Act would require a racially-
balanced workforce and that employers with imbalanced workforces
would be forced to establish hiring preferences. 55  Justice Brennan
determined that Congress had responded to the first concern with
statutory language specifically stating that the Act did not require
racial balance.' Since Congress did not respond in a similar manner
to the second objection, Justice Brennan concluded that hiring prefer-
ences were permitted.5 7
With regard to the impact of the program on Kaiser's white
employees, the opinion emphasized that the plan did not require the
discharge of any non-minority workers nor did it bar their advancement
through the ranks. As a consequence, the program did not "unnecessar-
ily trammel the interests of the white employees."58 Further justifica-
tion of Kaiser's hiring goals was found in the limited duration of the
program and in the program's objective of eliminating a "manifest"
racial imbalance in Kaiser's workforce.59
54. Id. at 204.
55. Id. at 205 (referring to the comments of Senator Sparkman, D. Ala., 110
Cong. Rec. 8618-19 (1964)).
1 56. Id. at 205-06. Section 703(0) provides that nothing in the language of
Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer.., to grant preferential
treatment ... to any group because of the race... of such group on account of'
obvious racial imbalance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982). The legislative history
indicates that this section was designed as a compromise to avoid opposition to
what critics saw as undue federal regulation of the workplace.
57. Weber, 443 U.S. at 206. Justice Brennan stated that "[tihe natural
inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action." Id.
58. Id. at 208-09.
59. Id. at 209. Justice Blackmun concurred with the result but he did not
agree with the conclusion that affirmative action is justified whenever the job
category in question was "traditionally segregated." Id. at 212. Justice
Blackmun suggested that affirmative action programs should be limited to
circumstances in which the employer or union had committed what he termed
an "arguable violation" of Title VII. Id. at 211. In Justice Blackmun's view,
Justice Brennan's "traditionally segregated" standard was over-inclusive because
it considered conditions that existed prior to the effective date of Title VII. Id.
at 214. The traditionally segregated standard also compared the percentage of
minority employees in an employer's workforce to the percentage of minorities
in the geographic area instead of comparing the percentage of minority workers
qualified to perform the jobs to the percentage of minorities in the employer's
199o]
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b. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that Title VII prohibits
employers from considering race when making an employment decision
irrespective of the race of the individual. He believed that "Kaiser's
racially discriminatory admission quota [was] flatly prohibited by the
plain language of Title VII."' In an argument which highlighted one
of the major divisions within the Court, Justice Rehnquist claimed that
Justice Brennan's interpretation of Title VII was at odds with the
"uncontradicted" legislative history of the statute.61 Justice Rehnquist
explained that the debates which resulted in the enactment of Title VII
reflect a struggle between opponents and supporters of the bill. The
opponents repeatedly charged that federal agencies which would be
responsible for enforcing Title VII would construe the term "discrimina-
tion" to mean the existence of racial imbalances in an employer's
workforce. The opponents also claimed that the bill would force
employers to hire on the basis of race. When these claims were
asserted, supporters of the bill responded that racial preferences would
not be permissible and that the Act would flatly prohibit the use of
racial quotas.
Justice Rehnquist believed that opponents to Title VII anticipated
the circumstances of Weber and were assured by their colleagues that
racial quotas would not be allowed.62 For these reasons, he contended
that the majority's decision in Weber was prohibited by the plain
language of Title VII, as well as the legislative history of the Act.
Justice Rehnquist did not address workforce imbalances which are
the product of discriminatory practices. He did not refute the majority's
finding that the absence of black employees from Kaiser's skilled craft
unions was the direct result of the racial discrimination. Furthermore,
if Kaiser and the Steelworkers had adopted a color-blind hiring
standard, the injuries sustained by victims of prior discrimination would
not have been redressed. Minority applicants who were denied jobs
workforce. For these reasons, Justice Blackmun believed that standard should
have been more narrowly drawn. Id. at 214.
60. Id. at 228.
61. Id. at 222. Justice Rehnquist refers to Justice Brennan's analysis as "a
tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but
of escape artists such as Houdini." Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 237-38. Addressing the opponents, Senator Humphrey stated
"[the truth is that [Title VII] forbids discriminat[ion] against anyone on account
ofrace.... Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this Title, there is
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to
require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota'
or to achieve a certain racial balance .... ." Id. at 238.
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would have had to resort to a class action or individual suits to seek
redress for the injuries that they suffered as a result of discriminatory
practices.
With this exposure in mind, Kaiser and the Union negotiated a
compromise which was intended to advance the interests of minority
applicants and to protect their own interests. Weber raises the knotty
problems presented by the transition from discriminatory hiring
practices to a nondiscriminatory system. Based on a history of
discriminatory practices, employers are exposed to Title VII liability if
they fail to correct the effects of these practices. At the same time,
however, they risk claims of reverse discrimination when affirmative
action is taken. The "employer's dilemma" is recognized in Justice
O'Connor's opinions in subsequent decisions where she suggests what
may be the best approach to this issue.6
2. Johnson v. Transportation Agency
a. Plurality Opinion
Several years after the Weber decision, the Court's approval of
voluntary affirmative action programs was upheld in another case,
Johnson v. Transportation Agency.6 In Johnson, the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to an affirmative action plan which authorized
an employer to consider sex or race as a "plus factor" in its selection and
promotion process. The events which led to the Johnson decision began
when the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency announced a
vacancy for the promotional position of road dispatcher. After the
applications were received, one of the male applicants was tied for
second place in the rankings with a score of seventy-five. Diane Joyce,
a female applicant, ranked slightly lower with a score of seventy-
three.6
At the time of the selection, the agency did not employ any women
in its skilled craft positions and had never employed a woman as a road
dispatcher. While the applications were pending, the Coordinator of the
Agency's Affirmative Action Office recommended the selection of the
female applicant. During the district court trial, the selecting official
63. In a footnote, Justice Brennan states that the Court's decision "makes
unnecessary consideration of petitioners' argument that their plan was justified
because they feared that black employees would bring suit under Title VII if
they did not adopt an affirmative action plan." Id. at 209 n.9. Justice
O'Connor's suggestion is discussed in her concurring opinion in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
64. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) [hereinafter Johnson].
65. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623-24.
1990]
15
Ware: Ware: Remedy for the Extreme Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
testified that his decision to select Diane Joyce was based on his
consideration of the candidates' qualifications, test scores, expertise, and
backgrounds. He also considered the county's affirmative action
program.66
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan
reiterated the standard of review he had endorsed in Steelworkers of
America v. Weber. Under this standard, an affirmative action plan can
be justified under Title VII if: 1) there is a "manifest imbalance" in the
employer's workforce which reflects female or minority under-
representation in "traditionally segregated job categories"; and 2) the
plan does not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of non-minority
employees.67
To satisfy the first prong of this standard, the employer should
compare "the percentage of minorities or women in the employer's
workforce with the percentage in the area labor market."68 Justice
Brennan emphasized that when the job requires special skills or
expertise, the comparison should focus on the percentage of minorities
or women in the employer's workforce and the percentage of qualified
minorities or women in the geographic area.69
Applying that standard to the present case, the plurality noted the
Transportation Agency had found its female employees heavily
concentrated in jobs traditionally occupied by women. Based on the
finding of underrepresentation, the Agency's affirmative action plan
established short-term hiring goals under which the race or sex of
applicants could be a plus factor in hiring decisions. Since Santa
Clara's hiring goals were the result of a finding of underrepresentation,
Justice Brennan found that the agency's plan satisfied the first prong
of the standard because it was "designed to eliminate Agency work force
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories.""
With regard to the second prong of the test, Justice Brennan
determined the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of
non-minority employees. To support this conclusion, Justice Brennan
noted that none of the Agency's positions had been set aside solely for
66. Id. at 624-26. The district court found the Agency's plan invalid based
on Weber's "temporary" criteria; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985).
67. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32.
68. Id.
69. Id. Justice Brennan refers to Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), for comparisons involving unskilled labor; Weber for comparisons
involving admission of unskilled laborers to training programs; and Hazelwoood
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), for the standard where
special job skills are required.
70. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637.
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women. In fact, the plan expressly stated that the hiring goals were not
to be construed as numerical quotas. Justice Brennan also noted that
since there were seven other qualified applicants, the petitioner was not
entitled to a promotion. Thus, the denial of a promotion did not
unsettle any "legitimate firmly rooted expectation of the petitioner."
71
Justice Brennan emphasized the limited duration of the program which,
in his view, was intended to "attain a balanced workforce, not to
maintain one."72 Based on this analysis, Justice Brennan concluded
that Title VII did not prohibit employers from considering an applicant's
race or sex as one factor in a multifaceted hiring decision if the decision
is guided by a legitimate affirmative action program.
b. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's holding that Title VII
does not prohibit race-conscious affirmative action programs but she
disagreed with what she deemed to be an unduly "expansive and ill-
defined approach."7 3  In Justice O'Connor's view, affirmative action
programs are warranted only as a remedial device to eliminate actual
discrimination or the lingering effects of discriminatory practices.
Justice O'Connor's concern was prompted by her view of the need to
balance competing interests. Justice O'Connor explained that employers
are "trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if
affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent employment
discrimination and liability to non-minorities if affirmative action is
taken."
74
Justice O'Connor argued that dangers posed by these competing
hazards could be minimized only if affirmative action plans are
supported by evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of pattern
and practice discrimination. Under this standard, a statistically
significant disparity in the percentage of women or minorities in an
employer's workforce compared to the percentage of qualified women or
minorities in the geographic area would justify a race or sex-conscious
affirmative action program. A program which simply seeks to develop
a workforce which approximates the total percentage of females or
minorities in the geographic region, however, would not be permissi-
ble.75
71. Id. at 638.
72. Id. at 639 (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 648.
74. Id. at 652 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 653-54. Such a program would unrealistically "assume that
individuals of each ,[sex] will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each
employer . . .absent unlawful discrimination". Johnson, 480 U.S. at 654
1990]
17
Ware: Ware: Remedy for the Extreme Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Despite her disagreement with Justice Brennan's analysis of the
evidentiary justification needed for an affirmative action plan, Justice
O'Connor was satisfied that Santa Clara County had a firm basis for
adopting its program. There were no women employed in any of the
transportation agency's skilled craft positions at the time the plan was
adopted. Moreover, the evidence presented during the trial indicated
that by 1970, women constituted at least 5% of skilled craft workers in
the geographic labor pool. Since this would have been sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Justice O'Connor
found Santa Clara's affirmative action plan amply justified.76
c. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia issued a dissent in which he not only disagreed with
the majority's decision, but went on to conclude that Johnson should
have been the occasion for reconsidering and overruling Weber. 7 After
labeling the majority's decision an "engine of discrimination,01 Justice
Scalia argued that the plain language of Title VII prohibits affirmative
action programs because the statute forbids employers from considering
race or sex in any employment decision. He also criticized the majority
for discounting the district court's finding that the county had never
discriminated against women. Thus, even under the majority's
reasoning, remedial action was not warranted in Justice Scalia's view.
Justice Scalia believed that instead of remedying the effects of past
discrimination, the majority's opinion would "give each protected racial
and sexual group a governmentally determined 'proper' proportion of
each job category."79
Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority's characterization
of the plan as "voluntary" and argued instead that the plan coerced
county officials to select female and minority workers at the expense of
white males. He disagreed with the majority's determination that sex
was merely one factor in a multi-faceted selection process and contend-
ed, as the district court had found, that Joyce's gender was the
determining factor in her selection.80
Justice Scalia was particularly concerned that the majority's
decision permitted racial and sexual discrimination against non-
(quoting Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 494).
76. Id. at 656-57.
77. Id. at 670. Justice Scalia was joined by the Chief Justice, and joined by
Justice White in Parts I and II; Justice White stated that he would also overrule
Weber. Id. at 657.
78. Id. at 658.
79. Id. at 660.
80. Id. at 663.
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minorities to overcome the effects of "societal attitudes that have limited
the entry of certain races, or of a particular sex, into certain jobs. "8
To support this conclusion, Justice Scalia claimed that the dearth of
women in various historically male job categories is not the result of
unlawful discrimination but because these jobs have "not been regarded
by women themselves as desirable work."
8 2
Justice Scalia also faulted Justice Brennan's reliance on Congress'
failure to amend Title VII to repudiate Weber as tacit approval of
Weber's holding that race and sex-conscious affirmative action programs
are permissible under Title VII. Congressional inaction, he believed,
could be the result of a variety of reasons including "unawareness,"
"indifference," or even "political cowardice." ' In short, Justice Scalia
believed that affirmative action programs require employers to engage
in intentional discrimination against non-minorities in violation of the
plain language of Title VII.
Despite the dissent's characterization of the affirmative action
program involved in Johnson as an "engine of discrimination," a
majority of the Justices have repeatedly approved the use of voluntary
affirmative action programs to eliminate the vestiges of long-standing
discriminatory practices. A consensus concerning a standard by which
to measure the legitimacy of such efforts, however, has not yet emerged.
Justice Brennan has urged that affirmative action programs are
justified as long as there is a "conspicuous racial imbalance in tradition-
ally segregated job categories."' Justice Blackmun found this stan-
dard too broad and argued for a standard which would limit affirmative
action to circumstances in which an employee has committed an
"arguable violation" of Title VII.85
Justice O'Connor has urged a third standard under which the
existence of a statistically significant imbalance between the percentage
of women or minorities in an employers' workforce, compared to the
percentage of qualified women or minorities in the geographic area,
would justify an affirmative action program in which race or sex is used
as a plus factor in the selection process. Justice O'Connor's approach
may reflect the best resolution of the "employer's dilemma." It allows
the employers to act to eliminate the vestiges of discriminatory practices
without actually admitting liability. At the same time, employers are
provided with a valid defense to claims of reverse discrimination. This
may be the most equitable means of effectuating the transition from a
discriminatory system.
81. Id. at 664.
82. Id. at 668 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 672.
84. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
85. Id. at 211.
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B. Court-Ordered Affirmative Action Programs
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association v. EEOC
In addition to endorsing voluntary affirmative action programs, the
Supreme Court has also found that race-conscious hiring and promotion
goals can be ordered to remedy proven violations of Title VII. In Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC,' the
Supreme Court held that Title VII authorizes district courts to order
race-conscious relief which benefits individuals who are not themselves
the victims of discrimination. The Court also found that when an
employer or union has engaged in long-standing or egregious discrimina-
tion, a race-conscious remedy may be the most effective means of
enforcing Title VII.
The case began when the New York State Commission for Human
Rights found that a labor union, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Worker's
International and Local 28, Joint Apprenticeship Committee, a
management-labor training program, had excluded blacks from the
union and the training program. The New York State Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed the Agency's findings.' After the Union failed
to comply with the court's order restraining it from engaging in
discriminatory practices, the Human Rights Commission initiated an
enforcement action in state court.89 The state court found that the
Union and Apprenticeship Program had not complied with the previous
order, and it again ordered them to cease their discriminatory practices.
The union and the training program persisted in their unlawful conduct
and were adjudged a third time to be in violation of a court order.0
In 1971, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a civil
action against the Union and the Apprenticeship Program in which the
State Commission for Human Rights intervened. At the conclusion of
the trial, the district court found that the Union and the Apprenticeship
86. 78 U.S. 421 (1986).
87. Id. at 445.
88. Id. at 427. See State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d
958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) [hereinafter Farrell].
89. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 428. See State Comm'n for
Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 244, 262 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965), affd, 24 A.D.2d 128, 264 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
90. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 428. See State Comm'n for
Human Rights v. Farrell, 52 Misc. 2d 936, 277 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967), affd, 27 A.D.2d 327, 278 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), affd, 19
N.Y.2d 974, 228 N.E.2d 691, 281 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. 1967).
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Program discriminated against non-white workers.9 ' Based on findings
that the Union and Apprenticeship Program had acted in bad faith and
in violation of a series of orders issued by the state courts, the district
court ordered hiring goals and a preference for the admission of non-
whites into the Union and the Apprenticeship Program.92 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's order with
minor modifications.
93
In 1982, the city and state initiated a contempt action which
resulted in a finding of civil contempt. In 1983, a second contempt
proceeding resulted in an additional finding of contempt. The contempt
citations were appealed and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed all but one of the trial court's various
contempt findings.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Union argued that
relief available under Title VII was limited to actual victims of unlawful
discrimination. A majority of the Justices disagreed.95 Speaking for
a plurality, Justice Brennan noted that the language of section 706(g)
authorizes courts to enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice and to order "such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees .. . or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate."' In Justice Brennan's view, this language
grants district courts broad discretion to remedy unlawful discrimina-
tion and allows "an employer or labor union to take affirmative steps to
eliminate discrimination which might incidentally benefit individuals
who are not the actual victims of discrimination."
97
The Union claimed that the last sentence of section 706(g)
91. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 429. See EEOC v. Local 638,
401 F. Supp. 467, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the district court found violations of
New York State Law and Title VII by discriminating against nonwhite workers
in recruitment, selection, training, and admission to the union).
- 92. Sheet Metal Workers'Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 432. The district court imposed
a 29% nonwhite membership goal, consistent with the appropriate New York
City labor pool, under court-appointed supervision. EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F.
Supp. at 489.
93. Id. at 433. See EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976) (the
court of appeals did modify the district court order, permitting the use of a ratio
system for entrance into the apprenticeship program pending new job-related
entrance examinations).
94. Sheet Metal Workers'Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 435-39; EEOC v. Local 638, 753
F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985).
95. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 440 (the plurality consisted of
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens).
96. Id. at 466 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1990)).
97. Id. at 447.
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prohibited a remedy which benefitted individuals who were not
themselves the victims of the employer's discriminatory practices. The
relevant portion of section 706(g) states:
No order of the Court shall require the admission or reinstatement or
hiring of an individual as a member of a union,... or the payment to
him any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspend-
ed, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in violation of
... this title.9
Justice Brennan disagreed with the Union's interpretation and found
instead that the sentence in question protects employers and unions
from being ordered to hire unqualified individuals as a remedy for
violations of Title VII 99
Justice Brennan also determined that race-conscious relief
advanced Title VIi's goals of achieving equal employment opportunities
and removing artificial barriers which historically operated to favor
white employees. He reasoned further that injunctive relief would be
appropriate in most cases, but some instances would require the union
or employer to take affirmative steps to end discrimination.1
0°
Furthermore, even when the employer abandons discriminatory
practices, informal mechanisms might continue to obstruct equal
employment opportunities. Justice Brennan also found that:
a district court may find it necessary to order interim hiring or
promotional goals pending the development of nondiscriminatory
hiring or promotion procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical
goals provides a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives:




Justice Brennan found additional support for his analysis in the
98. 2 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
99. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 447. Justice Brennan stated
that "[t]his reading twists the plain language of the statute." Id
100. Id. at 448. He believed that the lower courts had a very broad
congressional mandate to provide "the most complete relief possible," including
injunctions, as well as contemplating the potential futility of injunctions with
recalcitrant unions or employers, thus the need for court-ordered hiring
proportions. Id. at 448-49.
101. Id. at 450-51. Additional support was cited in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980) ("[W]here federal anti-discrimination laws have been
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legislative history of Title VII. During the debates over the enactment
of Title VII, opponents feared that discrimination would be interpreted
to mean mere imbalances in an employer's workforce and were
concerned that employers would be required to establish racial
preferences to avoid an imbalanced workforce. Supporters of the bill
responded that the legislation would not require hiring and promotional
quotas. When the opposition continued, supporters of the bill recognized
that their assurances to the contrary would not end the dispute
surrounding the racial balancing issue. As a consequence, they inserted
language which is now contained in section 7036). It provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require
any... labor organization, or joint labor management committee ...
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race.., of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race [admitted to the labor organization,
or to any apprenticeship program] in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race ... in any community,
state, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community state, section or other area.' 2
Supporters of the bill explained that subsection 703() was added to
make it clear that Title VII does not require employers to maintain
racially-balanced workforces. The legislative history does not similarly
address the question of whether numerical quotas would be an
appropriate remedy for proven violations of the statute. For answers to
this question, Justice Brennan turned his attention to the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In this portion of the
Congressional Record, Justice Brennan found that Senator Ervin had
responded to hiring goals and timetables established by the Department
of Labor with accusations of reverse discrimination. His response was
a proposed amendment which would have specifically outlawed race-
conscious remedies.10
3
Senator Ervin's proposal was met with vigorous objections.
Opponents to the Ervin Amendment cited with approval several court
and administrative orders which had used race-conscious remedial
102. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j) (1982).
103. Sheet Metal Workers'Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 467. Senator Ervin's proposal
stated that "[n]o department, agency, or officer of the United States shall require
an employer to practice discrimination in reverse by employing persons of a
particular race ... in either fixed or variable numbers, proportions, percentages,
quotas, goals, or ranges". Id. His proposal was attacked as disastrous to the
concept of affirmative action. Id.
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measures as a remedy for discriminatory practices.' ° 4 Senator Ervin's
proposed amendment was ultimately defeated by a two-to-one mar-
gin' °5. Although Justice Rehnquist reviewed the legislative history of
the 1964 legislation in Weber and reached the opposite conclusion,
Justice Brennan found that the events surrounding the 1972 amend-
ments strongly evidenced congressional ratification of race-conscious
remedies.' °6
Justice Brennan stressed that race-conscious remedies would not be
the appropriate remedy in every case, emphasizing that a court should
be guided by sound legal principles and avoid measures which are
"invoked simply to create a racially balanced workforce."' Despite
these precautions, Justice Brennan confirmed that "a court may have to
resort to race-conscious affinmative action when confronted with an
employer or a labor union that has engaged in persistent or egregious
discrimination. Or such relief may be necessary to dissipate the
lingering effects of pervasive discrimination."'0'
After concluding that race-conscious remedies were permitted by
Title VII, Justice Brennan examined the petitioner's claim that the
affirmative action program violated the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment.' He acknowledged
that Justices had been unable to agree to the "proper test to be applied
in analyzing race-conscious remedial measures," 110 but he found it
unnecessary to do so because "the relief ordered in this case passes even
the most rigorous test-it is narrowly tailored to further the govern-
ment's compelling interest in remedying past discrimination."'
Justice Brennan explained that the Union and the Apprenticeship
Program had repeatedly been found guilty of engaging in repeated acts
of racial discrimination and that the lower courts had determined that
affirmative measures were needed to remedy the discriminatory
practices. The district court considered the efficacy of alternate
remedies and determined that stronger measures were necessary.
Furthermore, the affirmative action program did not unduly impair the
interests of white workers. As a result of this analysis, Justice
Brennan concluded that the affirmative action plan did not violate the
104. Id. at 467-68.
105. Id. at 468.
106. Id. at 469.
107. Id. at 475.
108. Id. at 476.
109. Id. at 479-80.
110. Id. at 480.
111. Id. (Justice Brennan synopsized the various tests as set out in the
opinions of Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant).
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Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment." 2
Justice O'Connor concurred in part with Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion but did not believe the hiring goals were permissible. Justice
O'Connor asserted that the hiring goal in this case was a "rigid racial
quota" which is not permitted by Title VIIs prohibition against racial
balancing." 3 Justice O'Connor contended that the Court's decision in
Firefighters v. Stotts" prohibited court-ordered remedies which
accorded racial preferences to individuals who were not themselves the
victims of discrimination, but conceded that a majority of the Justices
did not share her interpretation. Nevertheless, she believed that the
hiring goals that the district court ordered in this case were racial
112. Id. at 480-81. Justice Powell issued a separate opinion which
concurred, in large measure, with Justice Brennan. Id., at 483. Justice Powell
reiterated his position concerning the standard for reviewing a constitutional
challenge to a racial classification. Once again, Justice Powell argued that any
racial classification must be justified by a compelling state interest and the
means chosen to effectuate the purpose of the legislation must be narrowly
tailored to that goal. Id. at 484.
In this case, Justice Powell found that the petitioners' "egregious violations
of Title VII established, without a doubt, a compelling governmental interest
sufficient to justify the imposition of a racially classified remedy." Id. at 485.
With regard to whether the remedy was narrowly tailored, Justice Powell
identified the four factors which should be considered:
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the
remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group
members in the relevant population or workforce; and (iv) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met.
Id. at 486.
Justice Powell also indicated that some consideration should be given to the
effect of remedy on innocent third parties. Justice Powell found that all of these
considerations had been satisfied in this case. Based on the series of court
orders and the Union's long-standing disregard for them, Justice Powell
concluded that an affirmative action plan was the only effective remedy. The
duration of the hiring goals was limited and the goals were directly linked to the
percentage of nonwhites in the geographic area. The hiring goals were flexible,
and they did not harm innocent non-minority workers. Based on these
considerations, Justice Powell found that the Constitution allows the imposition
of flexible hiring goals as a remedy for past discrimination. Id. at 487-89.
113. Id. at 489.
114. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). The Stotts decision provoked academic comment
as well. See Comment, The Effect of Firefighters Local Union 174 u. Stotts on
the Negotiated Settlement of Title VII Law Suits, 34 EMORY L.J. 827 (1985);
Fram, Recent Development: The False Alarm of FIrefighters Local Union 1784
v. Stotts, 70 CoRNELL L. REV. 991 (1985).
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quotas which are prohibited by section 7030)."16
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice White who found in his
separate dissenting opinion that the affirmative action plan "established
not just a minority membership goal but also a strict racial quota that
the Union was required to attain.""6 Justice O'Connor also indicated
that racial hiring goals intended to serve as benchmarks by which
compliance with Title VII is measured would be consistent with section
703(j). Strict numerical goals, however, are not.17
Despite the objections of the dissenters, a majority of the Justices
found that neither Title VII nor the fourteenth amendment prohibit
courts from ordering race-conscious hiring and promotion goals as a
remedy to proven acts of racial discrimination, even when the beneficia-
ries of the hiring goals were not themselves the proven victims of
discriminatory practices. Although it would revisit the issue in other




1. Local 93, International Association of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland
a. Majority Opinion
Race-conscious hiring and promotion criteria have been negotiated
in the context of pending litigation. The resulting agreements were
approved by district courts and entered as consent decrees. The
Supreme Court has found that race-conscious remedies in these
circumstances do not violate Title VII. In Local Number 93, Internation-
al Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,"' the Supreme
Court held that the provisions of section 706(g)120 of Title VII do not
prohibit the entry of a consent decree which affords relief to individuals
who were not themselves the proven victims of an employer's discrimi-
natory practices.
115. Sheet Metal Workers'Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 490.
116. Id. at 499.
117. Id.
118. Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger, authored
a dissent in which he argued that § 706(j) "forbids a court to order racial
preferences that effectively displace non-minorities except for minority
individuals who have been the actual victims of a particular employer's racial
discrimination." Id. at 500.
119. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1986).
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In 1980, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters (the
"Vanguards") filed a class action against the City of Cleveland which
alleged discrimination with regard to hiring, assignment and promotion
of the city's firefighters. The city entered into settlement negotiations
with the plaintiffs. In 1981, a union which represented non-minority
firefighters intervened, objecting to the imposition of any racial quota
systems.
121
Negotiations between the Vanguards and the city resulted in a
proposed consent decree which reserved a fixed number of the planned
promotions for minority candidates, and which also contained long-term
minority promotion goals." The non-minority union objected to the
proposal and the failure to include it in the negotiations. The trial court
subsequently rejected the proposal and ordered the city, the Vanguards
and the Union to engage in settlement discussions. 12  After intensive
negotiations under a magistrate's supervision, counsel for the parties
prepared a revised agreement which was approved by the Vanguards
and the city but was rejected by the union. The district court overruled
the union's objection and approved the revised consent decree.124 The
revised decree created additional promotional opportunities for
firefighters of all races. The decree required promotional examinations
in the future and specified promotional goals for minority firefighters
over a four-year period. The district court stated the consent decree was
justified by "a historical pattern of discrimination in the promotions in
the City of Cleveland Fire Department."'125
The Union appealed the entry of the consent decree and the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court with one
judge dissenting. 1" When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
"sole issue" was "whether the consent decree [was] an impermissible
121. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 506. At this point, Cleveland had unsuccess-
fully litigated a number of discrimination suits involving municipal workers over
the previous eight years; counsel for the city stated that "Ey]ou don't have to
beat us on the head. We finally learned what we had to do and what we had to
try to do to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city to comply with
the law fully .... ." Id.
122. The city planned to make forty promotions to the rank of Lieutenant.
Sixteen of the forty promotions would have been reserved for minority
firefighters. The proposed decree also reserved for minority candidates three of
the twenty promotions to Captain; two of the planned ten promotions for
Battalion Chief; and one of the three planned promotions to Assistant Chief. Id.
at 506.
123. Id. at 508.
124. Id. at 511.
125. Id.
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remedy under section 706(g) of Title VII."'' Section 706(g) of Title
VII provides:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of
an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee or the payment to him of
any backpay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or was suspend-
ed or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ..
The Union claimed that section 706(g) prohibited courts from
awarding relief that would benefit individuals who were not the proven
victims of an employer's discriminatory practices. After holding in Sheet
Metal Workers' Association'29 that section 703(j) of Title VII authorized
district courts to order race-conscious relief which benefits individuals
who are not themselves the victims of an employer's discriminatory
practices, the majority found in this case that Title VII does not
preclude consent decrees which accord benefits to individuals who were
not the proven victims of discriminatory employment practices.'
8
"
The Union, supported by the United States as Amicus, argued that
section 706(g) established a limitation on the court's authority and
prohibited relief that would benefit nonvictims. A consent decree, they
claimed, was an "order of the court" that section 706(g) prohibited.
Since consent decrees are hybrids of contracts and court orders, the
majority found it necessary to examine the legislative history of Title
VII for an authoritative interpretation of section 706(g). 3 ' After
reviewing the legislative history, the majority concluded that section
706(g) was added to Title VII to preserve "management prerogatives"
and "union freedoms" to the maximum possible extent. 132  As a
consequence, the majority held that section 706(g) "does not restrict the
ability of employers or unions to enter into voluntary agreements
providing for race-conscious remedial actions."'1
'
The Union also claimed that even if section 706(g) did not directly
prohibit the consent decree, the decree was not valid because it accorded
greater relief than the district court was authorized to order. The
127. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 514 n.5.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1990).
129. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 86-
117 and accompanying text.
130. Sheetmetal Worker's Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 515.
131. Id. at 519-20.
132. Id. at 520 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
29 (1963)).
133. Id. at 521.
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majority rejected this argument and held that courts are not barred
from entering consent decrees which provide broader relief than a court
could have awarded after a trial.1M
b. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist issued a dissent joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger.'3 Justice Rehnquist believed individuals who were not them-
selves the identified victims of the city's discriminatory practices should
not have been preferred for promotions at the expense of non-minority
firefighters. He also argued that the Court's decision in Firefighters v.
Stotts" precluded class-wide relief in the absence of a showing of
injuries by individual members of the class and took issue with the
majority's finding that the union was not bound by any of the terms of
the consent decree since the city was obligated to accord hiring
preferences to minority firefighters. Justice Rehnquist concluded that
non-minority union members who would otherwise have received
promotions were obviously injured by the hiring preference.13 7
Justice Rehnquist also maintained that section 706(g) protects
"innocent non-minority employees from the evil of court-sanctioned
racial quotas."''1 To support this assertion, he relied on his interpre-
tation of portions of the legislative history of Title VII which indicate
the statute forbids quotas and racial balancing. He concluded the city's
failure to make individualized findings of discrimination with respect to
each of the minority firefighters required a conclusion that they were
not entitled to benefit from the consent decree.
The most questionable aspect of Justice Rehnquist's argument is
134. Id. at 528. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White claimed that the
majority had paid too little attention to the predicate necessary for race-
conscious remedies. Justice White argued that "an employer may adopt or be
ordered to adopt racially discriminatory hiring practices ... favoring actual or
putative employees of a particular race only as a remedy for its own prior
discriminatory practices disfavoring members of that race." Id. at 532.
Justice White found that the consent decree involved in this case indicated
that the Cleveland Fire Department had engaged in discriminatory conduct but
did not identify any actual victims of discrimination. Id. Despite this lack of
identification, the decree allowed black and Hispanic firefighters who ranked
below non-minority firefighters in seniority and examination results to be
preferred over senior and better qualified non-minority firefighters. Id. In
Justice White's view, " [t]his kind of leapfrogging... is an impermissible remedy
under Title VII." Id.
135. Id. at 535.
136. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
137. Id. at 537.
138. Id. at 541.
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that it fails to consider that non-minority firefighters who would have
"otherwise" received promotions would have done so under a discrimina-
tory system. How the non-minority firefighters might have fared under
a nondiscriminatory system which included minority workers is
speculative, at best. Justice Rehnquist discounted the "pattern and
practice" element of this case. The city conceded it had engaged in
discriminatory practices which adversely affected black and Hispanic
firefighters as a class, not as individuals. The extent of the injury may
be arguable. The fact of the injury is not. In any event, the majority
found that the consent decree was permissible and it affirmed this
proposition in United States v. Paradise,9 a case decided in 1987.
2. United States v. Paradise
a. Majority Opinion
In another consent decree case, United States v. Paradise,40 the
Court affirmed a "one-black for one-white" temporary promotion quota
based on its conclusion that the promotions served the government's
compelling interest in eradicating egregious racial discrimination. The
Court also found that the remedy imposed was narrowly tailored to
serving a compelling governmental purpose. 141
In 1972, the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety (the "Department") had
engaged in a pattern and practice of systemic exclusion of blacks from
the Department in violation of. the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution. 42  The district court enjoined the Department from
engaging in any discriminatory employment practices, including
recruitment, examination, appointment, training, promotion and
retention. The district court also ordered the Department "to hire one
black trooper for each white trooper hired until blacks constituted
approximately 25% of the state trooper force.' 143 The district court's
ruling was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 1'
In 1974, the plaintiffs brought an enforcement action which
resulted in a finding that the Department had failed to comply with the
139. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 186-88.
142. Id. at 153-54. See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
143. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154-55.
144. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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district court's original order.'" In 1977, the plaintiffs initiated a
supplemental proceeding which focused on the Department's promotion
practices. This proceeding resulted in the entry of a consent decree in
which the Departnent agreed to develop nondiscriminatory promotion
procedures within one year after the entry of the decree. A clarifying
order was later issued which emphasized that the 1972 ruling was not
limited to entry level positions, but applied instead to all levels of the
state trooper force.
146
The Department later sought the court's approval of a proposed
promotion procedure. The plaintiffs objected to the Department's
proposal, and the dispute was later resolved by the development of a
consent decree which was approved by the district court in August of
1981. The parties agreed to the development and administration of a
nondiscriminatory promotion examination. When the promotion
examination was actually administered, however, it disproportionately
disqualified black employees. As a consequence, in 1983 the plaintiffs
returned to the district court and requested an order that would require
the Department to comply with the previously entered consent de-
crees.
147
A class consisting of white state troopers intervened, claiming that
the decrees were illegal and unconstitutional. After finding that
"conspicuous" and "pervasive" discriminatory practices were still in place
twelve years after the entry of its original order, the district court
ordered a temporary 50% promotional goal to the rank of corporal if
qualified black applicants could be found. In addition, "the court
imposed a 50% promotional quota in the upper ranks, but only if there
were qualified black candidates, if the rank [was] less than 25% black,
and if the Department had not developed and implemented a promotion
plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank"'148 The Court thus
emphasized the temporary and flexible nature of the goals.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan's
145. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 156-57. The court found that the defendants, in
a scheme to defeat or deny relief to plaintiffs, had artificially restricted the size
of the troop and number of troopers hired. See Paradise v. Dothard, No. 3561-N
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 1975).
146. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 157-58.
147. Id. at 159-60. Plaintiffs specifically urged that defendants be ordered
to promote black troopers to supervisory rank (corporal) at the same rate hired,
contending such order would motivate defendants to develop and implement a
valid--i.e., non-discriminatory--promotion policy and procedure, alleging such an
order would "help to alleviate the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the
supervisory ranks of the department" resulting from the department's
continuing refusal to implement a fair plan. Id. at 160.
148. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
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plurality opinion noted preliminarily "[i]t is now well established that
government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial
classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic
groups subject to discrimination."'149 Justice Brennan acknowledged
that the Justices had been unable to agree to the level of scrutiny
required for an appropriate constitutional analysis of a race-conscious
remedy. Nevertheless, he found the relief ordered by the district court
permissible because it satisfied the most exacting interpretation of the
strict scrutiny standard."5
With respect to the first prong of the standard, the Court found and
the Department had conceded that "the pervasive, systematic, and
obstinate discriminatory conduct of the department created a profound
need and a firm justification for the race-conscious relief ordered by the
District Court. 151 The Department and the intervenors argued that
the relief awarded was not warranted since the district court had only
found discrimination with respect to the Department's hiring practices.
The Supreme Court disagreed and found instead that the trial court's
record amply supported its finding that the Department had engaged in
discriminatory hiring and promotion.
52
The United States claimed, on behalf of the Department, that the
remedy was not narrowly tailored to achieving the goal of eliminating
discrimination in the State of Alabama's Department of Public Safe-
ty.'" Before responding to the merits of this argument, Justice
Brennan indicated that in determining the validity of race-conscious
remedies, the factors to be considered were: (1) the necessity for the
relief; (2) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (3) the flexibility and
duration of the relief including the availability of any waiver provisions;
(4) the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;
and (5) the impact of the remedy on third parties.1"
149. Id. at 166 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 426 U.S. 267 (1986);
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)).
150. Id. at 166-67. Here Justice Brennan refers to the Wygant standard:
the relief ordered by the lower court withstands strict scrutiny, as it is "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling [governmental] purpose". Id. at 167 (quoting
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274).
151. Id. The forty-year record of discriminatory practice within the agency
was voluminously reported from the 1972 lower court decisions; a record of
"egregious discriminatory conduct.., pervasive, systematic, and obstinate." Id.
at 167.
152. Id. at 168-69.
153. Id. at 171. The Justice Department originally supported the plaintiffs.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the federal government was
arguing on behalf of the State of Alabama.
154. Id. at 171 (referring to the analysis set forth in Sheet Metal Worhers'
Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 481).
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The opinion held the relief ordered by the district court necessary
to eliminate the effects of pervasive discriminatory practices and to
coerce the State of Alabama into compliance with a series of court
orders that had been flouted over a twelve year period. It also found
that there were no effective altematives.'5
Justice Brennan concluded further that the goals were flexible and
limited in duration. The promotional goal was contingent on the
availability of eligible black candidates, only operated to the extent the
force remained less than 25% black, and would expire upon the
development of a non-discriminatory promotion procedure. The
numerical goal was found reasonably related to the relevant labor
market. The overall goal of a 25% black force reflected the percentage
of blacks in the relevant geographic labor pool. The 50/a, one-black for
one-white hiring requirement was designed to achieve the overall goal
of a 25% black workforce.
1w
Justice Brennan also determined that the rights of third parties
were not unduly burdened by the hiring and promotional goals. No
white employees were fired and the promotional goals did not act as a
bar to their progress through the ranks. The burden imposed was
diffuse, "foreclosing only one of several opportunities. " 16 7 He also
found "[d]enial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as loss of an existing job."'"
155. Id. at 171-73. It is an understatement to say that the defendants
lacked credibility at this stage of the proceedings. In reviewing the incredible
record of discriminatory practice, Justice Brennan stated that "we find it
astonishing that the Department should suggest that in 1983 the District Court
was constitutionally required to settle for yet another promise that such a
procedure would be forthcoming 'as soon as possible."' Id. at 172-73.
156. Id. at 179. Justice Brennan analogized this requirement to that found
in Sheet Metal Worker's Ass'n "of an end date, which regulated the speed of
progress toward fulfillment of the hiring goal." Id. at 180.
157. Id. at 183 (quoting Justice Powell's opinion in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283).
Here, unlike layoffs, there is no burden placed on particular individuals, only a
postponement of promotions for otherwise-qualified white troopers. Id
158. 480 U.S. at 183 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83). Justice
Powell issued a concurring opinion which endorsed Justice Brennan's application
of the strict scrutiny standard and reiterated his view that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate method of constitutional analysis. Id at 186-89. Justice
Stevens issued a separate opinion which emphasized his view that the district
court was not required to narrowly tailor a remedy for a constitutional violation.
Id at 194-95. Justice Stevens also disagreed with the dissent's argument that
the district court's order had to be supported by a compelling governmental
interest. In Justice Steven's view, the standard for reviewing an order issued
by a federal court is not the same as that which is used to review state executive
or legislative actions. Id. at 190 n.1. The courts' broad equity powers, in Justice
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b. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor entered a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist.'59 The dissent conceded
that there was a compelling interest in eliminating the Department's
long-standing and pervasive discriminatory practices. Justice O'Connor
believed, however, that the remedy was not narrowly tailored to
accomplish this purpose.16
Justice O'Connor argued that the temporary one-for-one promotion
goal was not designed to eradicate the effects of past discrimination
because the promotional examination which was ultimately adopted
resulted in a lower percentage of black promotions (23%) than the
Court's original goal of 25%. In her view, the one-for-one promotional
goal was not related to the goal of achieving a 25% minority work-
force. 161
Justice O'Connor also believed that there were other options
available for securing compliance with the district court's order that
would not have affected the interests of white employees. She argued
that the strict scrutiny standard required the district court to explore
exhaustively the efficacy of alternative remedies prior to the imposition
of race-conscious relief. In her view, that process did not occur in this
case.
Although the dissenting Justices argued strenuously against the
result, the majority approved of race-conscious approaches to hiring and
promotion goals, in the context of voluntary programs, court-ordered
remedies, and negotiated consent decrees. In each of the employment
cases, race-conscious measures were used to integrate racially segregat-
ed workforces and were employed only where longstanding discriminato-
ry practices had excluded minority workers. In some cases, additional
justifications were derived from the actions of recalcitrant defendants
who continued to resist legitimate efforts to eliminate racial barriers
after the entry of court orders. In these circumstances, it appears that
race-conscious remedies are not only a permissible means of eliminating
discriminatory practices, but may be the only effective means where the
practices are systemic or when there is resistance to less stringent
approaches.
Stevens' view, are far broader and more flexible that those suggested by Justice
O'Connor's dissent. Id
159. Id. at 196.
160. Id. at 197. Justice O'Connor believed that the Court used a "standard-
less view of 'narrowly tailored"' that was much less stringent than required by
"strict scrutiny". Id.
161. Id. at 198.
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1. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts
Although race-conscious hiring and promotional efforts have been
repeatedly approved, the Supreme Court has just as consistently
disapproved of affirmative action plans which resulted in the displace-
ment of incumbent non-minority employees. For example, in Fire-
fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 162 the respondent, Carl Stotts,
filed a civil action which claimed that the Memphis Fire Department
had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination with
regard to hiring and promotions. During the pendency of the case,
settlement negotiations ensued which ultimately resulted in the entry
of a consent decree. Although the city did not admit to any actual
violations of Title VII, it agreed to provide promotions and backpay to
certain identified individuals and it also agreed to implement some long-
term hiring goals.16
The consent decree in Stotts did not address reductions in force or
layoffs, but a consent decree entered in an earlier case in which the city
was the defendant specified that transfers, rank, promotions, assign-
ment and seniority would be determined in accordance with the
employee's seniority with the City of Memphis.'6 In 1981, the city
announced a layoff in which it followed a "last-hired first-fired" policy.
Stotts sought to enjoin the layoffs on the grounds that they would
violate the consent decree. The Firefighter's Union intervened, and at
the conclusion of a temporary injunction hearing, the district court
found the proposed layoffs racially discriminatory. 6 '
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it held that the district
court's injunction did not carry out the purposes of the consent decree,
162. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
163. Id. at 565 (the city promoted the named individuals, provided backpay
to eighty-one fire department employees, and established a goal to increase black
representation in the various job categories in proportionto their numbers in the
labor force).
164. Id. at 566. This 1974 decree provided that promotions, transfers, and
assignments be computed "as the total seniority of that person with the City."
Id.
165. Id. at 567. While the district court stated that the layoffs were "in
accordance with the City's seniority system and was not adopted with any intent
to discriminate," it concluded that the proposed layoffs would indeed have a
discriminatory effect, and ordered the city not to apply the proposed policy
insofar as to decrease the percentage of blacks in various fire department job
classifications. Id. In complying with this order, some non-minority fire
department employees with greater seniority than minority employees were
either demoted in rank or laid off. Id. at 567 n.2.
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remedying past hiring and promotion practices. The majority also found
that section 703(h) of Title VII protects bona fide seniority systems as
long as the seniority system is not itself the product of discrimina-
tion." As a consequence, incumbent employees could not be denied
the benefits of a valid seniority system in order to provide a remedy for
a pattern and practice of discrimination.
The majority also held the district court did not have the inherent
authority to modify the terms of a consent decree based on a conclusion
that seniority-based layoffs would undermine the affirmative action
goals of the decree. Speaking for the majority, Justice White explained
that section 703(h) permits valid seniority systems as long as the
seniority system is not itself the product of discriminatory practices.0 7
Here, .there was no evidence offered to indicate that the Memphis
seniority system was discriminatory. The majority also found that the
court of appeals' conclusion-that the injunction advanced the settle-
ment goals of Title VII-was unfounded. In the majority's view, there
was no actual settlement since the Firefighter's Union objected to the
district court's modification of the consent decree. 1'
The court of appeals had justified the district court's injunction
because it placed the minority firefighters in the positions they would
have occupied in the absence of unlawful discrimination. According to
the court of appeals, this result was an appropriate remedy under the
"make whole" theory of Title VII. 169 The Supreme Court disagreed.
It noted that the case had been settled without an admission of liability.
Thus, there were no individualized showings that specific members of
the class would have been entitled to awards of retroactive seniori-
ty 70 More important, even when such a showing is made, the
prevailing plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to have non-minority
employees laid off when all of the employer's positions are filled. In
such a circumstance, the prevailing party could be required to wait until
166. Id. at 577-78. A bona fide seniority system is not invalid even when
it operates to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination as long as the
seniority system is not itself the product of discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 767-71 (1976); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-55 (1977).
167. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578-79.
168. Id. at 578 ("The settlement theory, whatever its merits might otherwise
be, has no application when there is no 'settlement' with respect to the disputed
issue.").
169. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418-22 (1975); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763-67 (1976).
170. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579.
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positions become available. 7'
2. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
In another case involving layoffs, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,172 the Court struck down a provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement which retained probationary minority employees
during layoffs, but displaced non-minorities with greater seniority. In
1972, the Jackson Board of Education proposed an amendment to an
existing collective bargaining agreement with a teacher's union. The
board and the union ultimately agreed to an amendment which provided
that employees with less seniority would be laid off prior to employees
with more seniority, "except that at no time will there be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of
minority personnel employees at the time of the layoff."'
173
During 1976-77 and again in 1981-82, the board applied the
amended collective bargaining agreement to a series of layoffs. This
resulted in the retention of probationary minority teachers when
tenured non-minority teachers were being laid off. The displaced non-
minority teachers filed this action in federal court alleging violations of
Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. section 1983.174
The district court held the layoff procedures established by the
amendment to the collective bargaining agreement were not required to
be justified by a prior finding of discrimination. The court also held
171. Id. at 579. Justice Blackmun authored a dissent which was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 593-621. Justice Blackmun believed that
the recall of the laid-off employees and the reinstatement of the demoted
employees rendered the challenge moot. Id. at 593. Justice Blackmun also
believed that the majority's opinion was erroneous because it treated the entry
of a preliminary injunction as if it were a judgment on the merits. Id. In
Justice Blackmun's view, the injunction which prohibited the layoff of black
employees did not require the city to lay off white employees. Id. at 610. The
city was left with other options to address its fiscal crisis. Furthermore, to the
extent that the layoff of white employees violated their seniority rights, a
remedy was available in the grievance process established by the Union's
collective bargaining agreement. Id.
Justice Blackmun also believed that the minority firefighters had not been
given a full and fair opportunity to prove their claims. The claims of the
minority firefighters (that the proposed layoffs discriminated against them)
might have been proven if the case had gone to trial. Id. at 615.
172. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) [hereinafter Wygant].
173. Id. at 270. The collective bargaining agreement defined "minority
group personnel" to include blacks, American Indians, and those of Oriental or
Spanish descent. Id. at 271 n.2.
174. Id. at 270.
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that the race-conscious layoff procedures were justified as a remedy for
past societal discrimination. The court also found that the amendment
promoted the legitimate goal of providing role models for minority
schoolchildren.
7 5
The Supreme Court disagreed. Speaking for a plurality, Justice
Powell found that the amendment to the collective bargaining agree-
ment "operates against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and
therefore constitutes a classification based on race."176 As a conse-
quence, Justice Powell found that classification "must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest" and that "the means chosen to
effectuate its purpose must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal."
177
Justice Powell found that some showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit must be made to justify the adoption of race-
conscious remedies. The district court's role-model theory was rejected
because it had no "logical stopping point" and did not bear a demonstra-
ble relationship to any harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring
practices. 17 8  In Justice Powell's view, "[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy."'1 9 The school board claimed that the purpose of the layoff
procedure was to remedy prior discrimination by the school board
against minority teachers. Justice Powell determined that this
admission was not sufficient. He believed that a factual predicate was
necessary and in this case, "no such determination ever ha[d] been
made."'18 Based on the lack of a formal finding of prior discrimina-
tion, Justice Powell concluded that the board had not satisfied the
compelling justification requirement of the strict scrutiny standard. 8 '
Justice Powell also found that "the Board's layoff plan [was] not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. . . . Other, less intrusive means of
accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring
goals-[were] available." 82 Justice Powell believed that layoffs were
too intrusive to serve as a legitimate means of achieving the board's
175. Id. at 272.
176. I& at 273.
177. Id. at 274 ("Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not
conflict with constitutional guarantees.") (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274).
178. Id. at 275.
179. Id. at 276. Justice Powell noted that numerous reasons could be found
for the disparity between student and faculty minority composition, and that
"[iln fact, there is no apparent connection between the two groups." Id.
180. Id. at 278.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 283-84.
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goals. The adverse financial and psychological effects of even a
temporary layoff were too heavy a burden for the non-minority teachers
to bear. After noting that the rights and expectations surrounding
seniority are the most valuable assets that a worker owns, Justice
Powell indicated that the board could have achieved its goal by less
intrusive means.
183
Justice O'Connor issued a concurring opinion in which she endorsed
Justice Powell's application of the strict scrutiny standard.'8 Justice
O'Connor also agreed that societal discrimination would not by itself
provide the compelling justification needed for race-conscious remedies.
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor observed that "[t]he Court is in
agreement that... remedying past or present discrimination by a state
actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use
of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.' 18 5  Here,
however, there was no finding that the board had engaged in discrimi-
natory practices.
Justice O'Connor also contended that the requirement of an
adequate factual predicate should not be construed to mean a formal
adjudication by a court or an admission of liability by the defendant.
She emphasized that "employers are trapped between the competing
hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to
remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to non-
minorities if action is taken." 186
To resolve this dilemma, Justice O'Connor suggested that an
adequate evidentiary basis for a race-conscious affirmative action
program exists when there is "demonstrable evidence of a statistical
disparity between the percentage of qualified blacks on a school's
teaching staff and the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant
labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern and
practice claim by minority teachers."'81 7 Justice O'Connor declined to
address the second aspect of the strict scrutiny standard, that is, how
to "narrowly tailor" the remedy.
It is noteworthy that the majority was unwilling to accept the
findings of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission or the board's own
assertion that it had engaged in discriminatory conduct. Furthermore,
183. Id.
184. Id. at 284-85. Justice O'Connor cites numerous decisions, including
Bakke and Fullilove, as standing for the proposition that any scheme of racial
classification must be viewed with strict scrutiny, a standard she believes to be
"held by all Members of this Court... however defined." Id. at 285.
185. Id. at 286.
186. Id. at 291 (emphasis in original). A further discussion of this
"employer's dilemma" is discussed supra at note 63.
187. Id. at 292.
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after indicating in her concurring opinion in Stotts that the parties could
have negotiated layoff priorities, Justice O'Connor suggested in this case
that layoffs are not a negotiable issue.
Justice Marshall dissented. Because he believed that the record
reflected a history of discriminatory hiring practices, Justice Marshall
would have held that the state had a compelling interest in "preserving
the integrity of valid hiring policy-which in turn sought to achieve
diversity and stability for the benefit of all students."'8
With regard to the means chosen to accomplish that goal, Justice
Marshall contended that the board's goal of integrating its faculty could
not be achieved without some modification to the seniority-based layoff
procedures. Justice Marshall also found that the revised layoff
procedures were narrowly tailored because they "allocate[d] the impact
of an unavoidable burden proportionately between two racial
groups.' 189 Justice Marshall emphasized that the amendment to the
collective bargaining agreement was the result of lengthy negotiations
in which several alternatives were considered and rejected. In his view,
the bilateral nature of the negotiations provided ample evidence for a
conclusion that the layoff procedures finally selected were the least
intrusive means of achieving the board's goal. 19°
Unlike the hiring and promotion cases, the Court was not willing
in Wygant and Stotts to approve affirmative action efforts which
resulted in the loss of jobs by incumbent non-minority employees. In
Stotts, the Court did not address the merits of the issue, but held
instead that a consent decree which did not address the question of
layoffs could not be construed to require the loss of seniority priorities
which protected the jobs of non-minority employees, even though the
existing layoff priorities undermined the minority hiring goals of the
consent decre&.
In Wygant, the Court addressed the layoff issue directly and held
that provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which divested the
seniority rights of tenured non-minority school teachers while retaining
probationary minority teachers could not be justified in the absence of
a compelling justification. Societal discrimination was not a sufficiently
weighty justification, and without an adequate foundation, the racial
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Furthermore, even if a compelling justification had been
shown, the majority opinion in Wygant indicates that the loss of an
existing job was far too intrusive to satisfy the narrowly tailored
requirement of the strict scrutiny standard.
Considered together, the employment cases indicate that race-
188. Id. at 306.
189. Id. at 309.
190. Id. at 310.
[Vol. 55
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
conscious remedial actions will be approved if there is an adequate
justification, except where they result in the loss of existing jobs held by
non-minority workers. Furthermore, a history of excluding minority
workers is sufficient to satisfy Title VII and the compelling justification
requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Further, it should be noted
that each of the employment cases involved efforts to eliminate
longstanding racial barriers which prevented minority workers from
securing employment opportunities.
None of the cases involved individual or isolated incidents of
discrimination. They all involved longstanding and systemic discrimina-
tory practices, which had operated to deny opportunities to minority
employees. Some of the cases had the added element of intransigent
defendants. In such cases, some sort of organized and systemic
approach would appear to be the most effective means of overcoming the
discriminatory practices.
A majority of the Justices have agreed that the elimination of
invidious discrimination is a compelling interest, regardless of whether
it involves a private employee seeking to eliminate the vestiges of
discriminatory actions, or a state or local government whose personnel
policies and practices operate to the detriment of minority workers.
The debate, of course, concerns the conflict between the interests of
minority workers who have long been precluded from equitable job
opportunities and non-minority employees who are now competing for
the same jobs. In this regard, however, the question is not one of
"reverse discrimination," that is, favoring minority candidates at the
expense of non-minority employees. The question, rather, is how to
eliminate customs and practices which were not eliminated by a
congressional prohibition against discrimination in employment.
Non-minority employees have long enjoyed a competitive advantage
by virtue of not having to compete with the entire labor market. As the
employment cases discussed above establish, when practices (whether
active or passive) operate to perpetuate those advantages, some action
beyond an order to cease the discriminatory conduct may be necessary.
It is in these circumstances that race-conscious efforts are justified.
Incumbent employees whose promotions are potentially effected
cannot claim that they are innocent bystanders since they gained their
positions at a time when minority workers were precluded from the
competition. How incumbents might have fared in an equitable system
cannot be determined. Furthermore, the Court has assured that
incumbent employees will not be displaced by minority workers. New
applicants who might be denied entry level positions because marginally
less qualified minority or female workers are temporarily preferred may
have some standing to complain, but the Court has found that diminu-
tion of one of several potential employment opportunities is only one of
many factors in a competitive balance. In each of the programs
approved by the Court, none of the non-minority candidates was totally
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foreclosed from competition and none was prevented from progressing
through the ranks. The thrust of the programs approved was inclusive.
Programs which foreclosed any consideration of non-minorities were
struck down.
The opponents of affirmative action are correct to the extent that
they believe that race or sex should not have any role in employment
decisions. This view looks to a goal which has not been achieved. The
issue now is how to accomplish the transition from a discriminatory
system to a system which is truly equitable. To argue now that no
consideration should be given to present effects of past discrimination
ignores the highly visible effects of a pervasive system of state-sanc-
tioned discrimination, and will in most cases simply operate to
perpetuate the status quo ante.
III. PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
A. Fullilove v. Klutznick'9 1
1. Majority Opinion
The third context in which the Court addressed legal challenges to
race-conscious remedial programs involved government procurement
practices. One of the procurement cases was among the first group of
affirmative action cases to reach the Supreme Court. Fullilove involved
a constitutional challenge to a federal public works statute which
required ten percent of the federal funds expended to be reserved for
minority business enterprises ("MBE"). The statute, the Public Works
Employment Act of 1976,192 authorized federal grants to state and
local governments to finance public works projects. The disputed
provision of the statute stated that "no grant shall be made under this
Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of
the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business
enterprises."i9
Several associations of construction contractors and subcontractors
fied suit claiming that the minority set-aside provision violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment
and various statutory anti-discrimination provisions.'9 The district
191. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) [hereinafter Fullilove].
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982).
193. Id. § 6705(e)(2).
194. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 455.
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court upheld the validity of the set-aside provision,195 and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit later affirmed the district court's
decision.' e
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion articulated a variation of the strict scrutiny standard which
consisted of an inquiry into whether the objectives of the Public Works
legislation were within Congress' powers and, if so, whether the use of
racial and ethnic criteria was a permissible means of achieving the
objectives of the legislation.197
With regard to the first aspect of the standard, Justice Burger
found that the Constitution granted broad spending powers to Congress.
Under this authority, Congress could legitimately condition federal
funds on the recipient's compliance with federal policies. Justice Burger
also found that under its constitutional power to regulate commerce,
Congress could act to prevent federal contractors from hampering
minority access to contracting opportunities.
198
Support for this conclusion was found in section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment which gives Congress the authority "to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation" the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Under this authority, Congress was authorized to enact
legislation designed to eliminate procurement practices that perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination. As a result of this analysis, Justice
Burger concluded that the objectives of the MBE legislation were within
Congress' constitutional authority. 19
Justice Burger then considered whether the use of racial and ethnic
criteria was a permissible means of achieving the goals of the Public
Works Employment Act. In doing so, Justice Burger acknowledged that
the means chosen to effectuate the objectives of the legislation must be
195. Id. The district court decision is reported at 443 F. Supp. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
196. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 455. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit previously held that the minority business enterprise provision
was not contrary to the Constitution, "even under the most exacting standard
of review". Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978).
197. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
198. Id. at 474.
199. Id. at 478. Justice Burger first reviewed congressional grants of
authority under the commerce power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; as the MBE
program "pertains to the actions of private prime contractors", id. at 476,
Congress could have employed its po.wers under the Commerce Clause to reach
the objectives of the MBE provision. However, "in certain contexts, there are
limitations on the reach of the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state
and local governments." Id. (citation omitted).
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narrowly tailored to achieving Congress' goals.' ° He found that since
the waiver provisions of the Public Works Act could be invoked to
prevent awards that did not carry out the objectives of the set-aside, the
means chosen was narrowly tailored to effectuate the goals of the
Act.20 ' The contractors' contention that "Congress must act in a
wholly 'color-blind' fashion" was rejected.20 2 Relying on the precedent
established by school desegregation cases,203 Justice Burger found that
Congress could enact race-conscious legislation designed to coerce state
action to eliminate discriminatory practices.
To the extent that non-minority firms would not receive procure-
ment contracts they might have received in the absence of the set-aside,
Justice Burger found that this result was an inconsequential incident
to the goals of the legislation. He noted with some irony that the
historic exclusion of minority contractors was similarly incidental to
"business as usual" in a segregated industry. °4  More important,
Congress could act on the assumption that many of the non-minority
firms that were objecting to the set-aside had themselves benefitted
competitively from the historic exclusion of minority contractors.
20 5
The contractors challenging the set-aside also argued that the class
benefitted was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.2 11 The class
was allegedly under-inclusive because it did not include all of the
individuals who had been the victims of discriminatory practices.
20 7
At the same time, the class was purportedly too broadly drawn since it
bestowed benefits on MBEs that had not themselves been the victims of
discriminatory conduct.2'
In Justice Burger's view, the fact that all victims of discriminatory
200. Id. at 480. While mindful of the deference due Congress on matters
within its power, Justice Burger notes that constitutional mandates, notably the
Due Process Clause, require the Court to view any racial or ethnic classifications
employed by Congress to remedy current effects of past discrimination with
"careful judicial evaluation" to ensure accomplishment of the goal without
violation of constitutional rights. Id.
201. Id. at 481-82. In addition to the waiver provision, an administrative
complaint mechanism existed to prevent unjust participation in the program by
non-bona fide MBE's. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
202. Id.
203. Swannv. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 408 U.S. 1,18-21 (1971).
204. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-85.
205. Id. at 485. Justice Burger noted that the non-minority contractors may
be presumed innocent of discrimination. He cites Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976), for the proposition that innocent parties
sharing the burden is not impermissible. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
206. Id. at 485-89.
207. Id. at 485-86.
208. Id. at 486-89.
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practices were not included within the statutory definition of MBE did
not undermine the constitutionality of the statute.' He found that
Congress could address broad problems one step at a time, focusing on
that aspect it deemed most severe.2 10  In addition, Justice Burger
found that the contractors had not shown that any identifiable minority
group had been intentionally excluded from the class benefitted by the
set-aside. 21' Based on this analysis, Justice Burger affirmed the
validity of the set-aside provision of the Public Works Act.21
2. Justice Powell's Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell analyzed the set-aside
provisions of the Public Works Act using the more traditional standard
that he had originally applied in Bakke.213 Applying this standard,
Justice Powell found that the set-aside in Fullilove had a compelling
justification. He also concluded that the means selected to effectuate
the legislation's goals were "equitable and reasonably necessary to the
redress of identified discrimination.
214
With regard to the compelling justification requirement, Justice
Powell believed that the federal government "does have a legitimate
interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimina-
tion,"'M but that this finding alone would not support an affirmative
action program. In Justice Powell's view, race-conscious remedies
should not be approved in the absence of judicial, administrative, or
legislative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. Further-
more, governmental bodies which act to impose a race-conscious remedy
must have the authority to respond to identified acts of discrimination.
Such a body must also establish an adequate evidentiary record of
discrimination. If these requirements are satisfied, the means selected
must be narrowly drawn to fulfill the governmental purpose.
209. Id. at 486.
210. Id. at 485.
211. Id. at 486. Justice Burger again noted that the congressional
.assumptions of (1) impairment of competitiveness of minority businesses by
current effects of past discrimination, and (2) that affirmative efforts would
result in participation by minority businesses, could be rebutted in the
administrative waiver and exemption protocols of the MBE program. Id. at 487.
212. Id. at 491-92. Justice Burger noted that while this opinion does not
adopt any of the Bakke formulations, "our analysis demonstrates that the MBE
provision would survive judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the
several Bakke opinions." Id. at 492.
213. Id. at 496.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 497.
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Applying these considerations to this case, Justice Powell found
that "the National Legislature is competent to find constitutional and
statutory violations. 216  After reviewing a number of precedents, he
concluded that Congress had the authority to identify discriminatory
practices and to prescribe remedies when violations were found. Justice
Powell believed there was an ample evidentiary basis for Congress'
conclusion that discrimination existed in the construction industry.2 11
After concluding that Congress had a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination in the construction industry and that the
congressional finding of discrimination had an ample evidentiary basis,
Justice Powell turned to the question of whether the means chosen were
narrowly tailored to achieving the legislation's goals. In evaluating the
validity of the means chosen, Justice Powell indicated that consideration
should be given to the "efficacy of alternative remedies" and the
"planned duration of the remedy. 2 1 1 With regard to the efficacy of
alternative remedies, Justice Powell noted that previous efforts had
been made to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the
construction industry. Nevertheless, by 1977, less than one percent of
the federal procurement contracts went to MBEs. Furthermore, the
duration of the set-aside was limited, since it would expire when the
Public Works programs ended. Justice Powell also found the 10% set-
aside justified since 4% of the nation's contractors were minorities and
17% of the nation's population consisted of minorities. The 10% figure
represented a compromise which fell between those figures.
2 19
Justice Powell also indicated that the effects of the set-aside on
third parties should be considered. In this case, the set-aside reserved
approximately 0.25% of all the federal construction funds for 4% of the
nation's contractors. The remaining 96% of the contractors were free to
compete for the remaining 99.75% of the construction funds. In Justice
216. Id. at 499 (contrasting the lack of competency by the University of
California Regents in Bakke).
217. Id. at 503-06. When the Public Works statute was enacted, the House
Sponsor, Representative Parren Mitchell, and the Senate sponsor, Senator
Edward Brook, both pointed to extensive hearings that were held in connection
with section 8a, the minority set-aside provision of the Small Business Act.
The operation of the section 8a program had been reviewed by congressio-
nal committees on numerous occasions between 1972 and 1977. During those
hearings, the committees concluded that discriminatory practices in the
construction industry were operating to impair minority access to contracting
opportunities. Justice Powell believed that these findings fully supported
Congress' determination that "purposeful discrimination contributed significant-
ly to the small percentage of federal contracting funds that minority business
enterprises have received." Id. at 504-06.
218. Id. at 510.
219. Id. at 511-14.
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Powell's view, the minimal loss to non-minority contractors was
outweighed by the goals of the set-aside provision. Based on these
considerations, Justice Powell concluded that the set-aside was a valid
exercise of congressional authorityY °
3. Justice Stewart's Dissent
Justice Stewart authored a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stewart contended that the Constitution is
colorblind and that all racial classifications are invidious. He believed
that any legislative classification should be subjected to the strict
scrutiny standard irrespective of whether the classification established
applies to racial minorities or majoritiesY2 1
In Justice Stewart's view, the set-aside provisions of the Public
Works Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it "bar[red] a class to which the petitioners belong
from having the opportunity to receive a governmental benefit, and
bar[red] the members of that class solely on the basis of their race or
ethnic background. '"22
The dissent also contended that unlike a court of equity, legisla-
tures lack the "objectivity" and "flexibility" that are needed to fashion
race-conscious remedies. In the dissents view, even if the legislature
had the authority to enact race-conscious legislation, it would not be
justified in this case because there was no showing that the federal
government had ever engaged in racially discriminatory procurement
practices. The dissent also contended that the Equal Protection Clause
immunizes individuals from unequal treatment. As a result, any
statute which affords a remedy to a group, as opposed to individuals,
cannot be justified under the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Stewart also claimed that statutory classifications of racial
groups would operate to reinforce negative racial stereotypes and to
bolster the belief that some racial groups are unable to achieve success
without special governmental protections. He believed that the set-
aside would foster unwarranted notions of racial entitlement, and
undermine the basic principles of equality that are embodied in the
fourteenth amendment.m
220. Id. at 514-15.
221. Id. at 523-24.
222. Id. at 527.
223. Id. at 527-30.
224. Id. at 531 ("[P]referential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.")
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
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4. Justice Stevens' Analysis
Justice Stevens issued a separate dissenting opinion which
criticized the manner in which the class benefitted by the set-aside had
been determined.' The class benefitted included Negroes, Spanish-
speaking persons, Orientals, Indians, and Aleuts. There was no
justification, however, in the statute or in the legislative history, which
explained why the class contained all of these groups. Justice Stevens
believed that since the various groups had been the victims of different
forms of discrimination, they should not have been the recipients of the
same degree of remediation.2M Justice Stevens argued further that
the class benefitted by the set-aside was too broadly drawn because it
included minority firms that were not the actual victims of discriminato-
ry practices.
Justice Stevens also objected to the legislation because he believed
that it would serve as a "permanent source of justification for grants of
special privileges."2 This approach, he believed, could potentially
support a legislative preference for almost any ethnic group with the
political power to negotiate a legislative preference. He also suggested
that the set-aside reflected political patronage. This contention was
based on portions of the legislative history which reflected a desire by
members of the Congressional Black Caucus to receive a portion of the
financial benefits flowing from the statute. This, he believed, was an
impermissible justification for the statute's racial classification.=
Although he disagreed with the manner in which the Public Works
Act was structured, Justice Stevens endorsed the goal of encouraging
and facilitating minority participation in the economy. He doubted,
however, that the set-aside statute was an effective means of accom-
plishing this goal.229
225. Id. at 532.
226. Id. at 535-39. Justice Stevens pointed out that "the negro was dragged
to this country in chains to be sold into slavery ... the 'Spanish-speaking'
subclass came voluntarily, frequently without invitation, and the Indians, the
Eskimos and the Aleuts had an opportunity to exploit America's resources before
the ancestors of most American citizens arrived. There is no reason to assume
... that each of these subclasses is equally entitled to reparations ... ." Id. at
538 (citation omitted).
227. Id. at 539.
228. Id. at 541-42. While Justice Stevens refers to "the legislative history
of the Act [which] discloses that there is a group of legislators in Congress
identified as the 'Black Caucus"' and that members of the Caucus argued for "a
piece of the action," he neglects to provide any specific citation to the Congressio-
nal Record. Id.
229. Id. at 542-43.
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Although he did not believe that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits racial classifications, Justice Stevens concluded that the set-
aside provisions of the Public Works Act were not narrowly tailored to
achieving the legislation's goals. For these reasons, Justice Stevens
argued that the statute did not satisfy the strict scrutiny standardY °
Fullilove was hailed as a victory by the proponents of affirmative
action. Following the Supreme Court's approval of the federal set-aside
in 1980, a number of state and local governments enacted set-aside
legislation which followed the Fullilove model. Commentators opposed
to affirmative action roundly criticized Fulllove, just as they had
previously denounced Bakke and would later castigate the pro-affirma-
tive action decisions that were issued in the employment cases. In
addition to academic criticism, opposition to affirmative action became
a political issue which was formally adopted by the Reagan Administra-
tion. Ironically, one of the articles critical of Fullilove was authored by
Professor Drew Days, the former Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights who represented the United States when Fullilove was argued
before the Supreme Court."' When another procurement case finally
reached the Court, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion relied heavily on
Professor Days' criticism to support the majority's invalidation of a set-
230. Id. at 548-53. Justice Stevens believed that the statute could not be
"narrowly tailored" "because it simply raises too many serious questions that
Congress failed to answer or to even address in a responsible way." Id. at 552.
Some of the questions Justice Stevens apparently wanted addressed include
"[wjhat percentage of Oriental blood or what degree of Spanish-speaking skill
is required for membership in the preferred class?" Id. at 552 n.30. He fails to
provide answers to these questions.
231. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987). Professor Days' approach to
the question of state and local government authority regarding set-asides is
compelling:
[W]e must be mindful that the federal government alone cannot be
expected to eradicate racial discrimination in America. Public
institutions at all levels must contribute to the effort. They are often
in a better position to identify the effects of racial discrimination and
to tailor corrective programs than is Congress. They should not be
disqualified from this endeavor; rather, they should be required to
proceed in a fashion that reduces the chances of irresponsible action
to an acceptable minimum. Courts' efforts to compel such heightened
accountability should focus on three factors that bear on the propriety
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B. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'
After Fullilove was decided in 1980, the Supreme Court was not
confronted with affirmative action in the procurement context until
Croson was decided in 1989. During the interim, the Court decided a
number of affirmative action cases in the employment context and,
perhaps more importantly, some significant changes had occurred in the
composition of the Court.2 In Croson, the Supreme Court invalidated
Richmond's set-aside ordinance.= After ten years of debate, a
majority of the Justices agreed, for the first time, to apply the strict
scrutiny standard to an affirmative action program.' Croson repre-
sents a significant change in equal protection jurisprudence and it
appears to reflect an emerging conservative majority within the Court.
The City of Richmond's set-aside ordinance required non-minority
prime contractors who performed work for the city to subcontract at
least thirty percent of the dollar amount of their contracts to a minority
business enterprise ("MBE").2 7 The ordinance allowed the director of
232. Professor Days noted in his Fullilove article, quoted in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472 (1989), that "Fuflilove clearly
focused on the constitutionality of a congressionally mandated set-aside
program." Days, supra note 232, at 474 (emphasis in original).
233. 109 S. Ct. 706 [hereinafter Croson].
234. Appointments by President Reagan include Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy, and the appointment of William H. Rehnquist (appointed as
Associate Justice by President Nixon) as Chief Justice; these appointments
replaced Justices Potter Stewart, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Chief Justice Warren
Burger.
235. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 730. Richmond adopted a "Minority Business
Utilization Plan" in 1983, codified as City Code § 12-156(a) (1985), requiring
prime contractors to subcontract no less than 30% of the dollar amount of the
prime contract to minority business enterprises; this plan did not apply to
minority-owned businesses awarded city contracts. Id. at 712-13.
236. Initially, the district court upheld Richmond's Minority Business
Utilization Plan, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. J.A. Croson
Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Croson 1];
Croson then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court, which remanded the
case due to the Court's intervening Wygant decision. The Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' decision to strike down Richmond's program in
JA. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Croson 12], as "violating both prongs of strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 716
(citations omitted).
237. Id. at 712-13.
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Richmond's Department of General Services to promulgate rules which
permitted a waiver of the set-aside requirement if the prime contractor
demonstrated that the requirement could not be satisfied.' Under
the city's purchasing procedures, contractors with the lowest bids were
required to submit forms on which they identified the MBEs which they
intended to hire and to indicate the total percentage of the contract
price that would be paid to the MBE. The completed MBE utilization:
forms or, in appropriate cases, requests for waivers, were forwarded to
the city's Human Resources Commission which verified the MBE
information or made a recommendation concerning the contractor's
request for a waiver.2 9
Thereafter, the city's Director of General Services made a final
determination concerning compliance with the minority subcontracting
requirement. There were no provisions for an appeal from the director's
final decision. If a contract were awarded to another bidder after a
finding of non-compliance with the set-aside requirement, however, the
disappointed bidder had a general right of protest under Richmond's
procurement regulations.2A°
The set-aside program had been adopted by Richmond's city council
after a public hearing.241 Proponents of the set-aside relied heavily on
a study which indicated that for the five year period between 1978 and
1983, only .67% of the city's prime construction contracts had been
awarded to MBEs, despite the fact that 50% of the city's residents were
black. 2A  The study also showed there were virtually no black mem-
bers of the various contractor trade associations in the Richmond area.
During the public hearing in which the ordinance was proposed, a city
councilman testified that widespread racial discrimination existed in
Richmond's construction industry."48
Opponents of the ordinance disagreed and argued that the low per-
238. Id. at 713.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing Richmond Va. City Code, § 12-126(a) (1985)). Although a
protest was available to a bidder denied the contract, the Director's discretion
and determination of compliance with the set-aside plan or the appropriateness
of a waiver "in this regard appears to have been plenary." Id.
241. Id. at 714.
242. Id.
243. Id. Councilman Marsh, a practicing attorney in the area since 1961,
stated on the record that the "general conduct of the construction industry in
this area, and the State, and around the nation, is one in which race discrimina-
tion and exclusion on the basis of race is widespread," yet "[t]here was no direct
evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or any
evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against minority-
owned subcontractors." Id. (citations omitted).
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centage of city contracts awarded to MBEs did not reflect discrimination
in the construction industry. Other opponents to the ordinance claimed
there were not enough MBEs in the Richmond area to satisfy the thirty
percent minimum. Witnesses representing contractor associations
claimed that their organizations did not exclude minority contractors.
At the conclusion of the public hearing, however, the ordinance was
enacted by a vote of six to two, with one council member abstaining.
2
"
1. Croson's Efforts to Obtain a City Contract
In 1983, the City of Richmond solicited bids for the installation of
plumbing fixtures at the city jail. J.A. Croson Co. ("Croson") decided to
submit a bid. Croson's regional manager contacted five or six MBEs in
an effort to satisfy the city's set-aside requirement.2" Melvin Brown,
the president of a local MBE, responded to Croson's solicitation and
subsequently contacted two vendors who sold the fixtures specified in
the city's original solicitation for bids. One company that Brown
contacted had previously quoted Croson a price for the fixtures but
refused to quote the fixtures to Brown; the other supplier did not want
to extend credit to Brown without a satisfactory credit check.246 When
the City of Richmond opened the bids, Croson turned out to be the only
bidder. On the same day, Brown advised Croson that he was having
difficulty securing credit approval. Six days later, Croson submitted a
formal request for a waiver of the set-aside requirement. Croson's
waiver request claimed that Brown was "unqualified" and that other
MBEs had been unresponsive.
247
After learning of Croson's request for a waiver, Brown contacted
another fixture supplier and later submitted a bid to Croson. After
Brown notified the city that he could supply the fixtures for the project,
the city denied Croson's waiver request and advised Croson that it had
ten days to submit an MBE utilization form. Croson responded with a
letter which argued that Brown was not an authorized dealer of the
plumbing fixtures in question. Croson also stated that Brown's bid was
244. Id. Arguments of the council included the possibility of a "windfall" for
the few minority-owned businesses in Richmond, as well as the threat of lost
jobs to Richmond area residents as the city's Minority Business Utilization Plan
did not specify geographic limits regarding contractors' location. Id.
245. Id. at 715. Initially, no minority-owned businesses either showed
interest in or supplied a quote for the subcontract; a second attempt to solicit
iVIBE participation was made on the day Croson's bid to the city was due. Id.
246. Id. No reason appears in the record to indicate why the supplier





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
subject to credit approval and that the price' Brown had quoted was
substantially higher than any other price quotation that Croson
received. In a second letter to the city, Croson explained in some detail
the additional costs that would result from Brown's participation and
requested authorization to adjust its bid in accordance with the
increased costs.'
The city denied Croson's waiver request as well as its request for
a cost adjustment. After the city elected to re-solicit the project, Croson
filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which challenged the
constitutionality of Richmond's set-aside ordinance.2
9
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
The City of Richmond argued before the Supreme Court that it had
broad legislative powers to define and attack the effects of prior
discrimination in its local construction industry and that it was not
required to make specific findings of discrimination to enact race-
conscious legislation.' Speaking for a divided Court, Justice O'Con-
nor disagreed. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor found "[t]he
Richmond Plan denie[d] certain citizens the opportunity to compete for
a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race."'2
i
As a consequence, a majority of the Justices held that the set-aside
program could not be justified in the absence of a compelling justifica-
tion. Although the plurality opinion conceded that public and private
racial discrimination had probably contributed to diminished opportuni-
ties for black entrepreneurs, it held "an amorphous claim that there
had been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the
use of an unyielding racial quota. "
252
248. Id.
249. Id. at 715-16.
250. Id. at 717. Richmond relied on the Court's decision in Fullilove, which
had been accepted by the divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Croson L Referred to by the Court as the Fourth Circuit's "synthesized
Fullilove test," the Richmond City Council's finding of generalized national
discrimination coupled with the statistical evidence peculiar to Richmond
rendered the Council's decision "reasonable" and "narrowly tailored to the
legislative goals of the [Minority Business Utilization] Plan." Id. at 716 (quoting
Croson I, 779 F.2d at 190).
251. Id. at 721.
252. Id. at 724. Justice O'Connor analogized that claims of discrimination
in primary and secondary education would not justify "rigid racial preference in
medical school admissions" and expressed the concern that these non-evidentiary
claims "would give local governments license to create a patchwork of racial
preferences based on statistical generalizations about any particular field of
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The plurality also found that the legislative facts on which the
Richmond City Council relied to justify its quota did not provide the city
with an adequate evidentiary foundation for race-conscious legislation.
In Part I of her opinion, Justice O'Connor found that the "conclusionary
statements" made by a City Council member concerning the presence of
racial discrimination in Richmond had minimal probative valueY
3
Justice O'Connor also found that when suspect classifications are
employed in legislative enactments, the legislating body cannot rely on
generalized assertions concerning the classification's relevance to its
goalY 4 Since Richmond had not shown a compelling justification for
its set-aside program, the majority held the ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3. The Limitations on the Authority of Localities
to Enact Race-Conscious Legislation
In Part II of her opinion, Justice O'Connor analyzed the scope of the
power of localities to adopt legislation which is designed to address the
effects of past discrimination. She determined that states and their
subdivisions "have the authority to eradicate the effects of private
discrimination [which takes place] within their own jurisdictions.""5
Furthermore, even if a city determines that it is merely "a 'passive
participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced [by its] local
construction industry, . . . the city could take affirmative steps to
dismantle such a system," providing it does so within the limitations
imposed by section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.2
Relying on Professor Days' analysis in his Fullilove article, Justice
O'Connor explained that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment vests
Congress with an affrmative grant of authority to enforce the four-
endeavor." Id.
253. Id. at 717.
254. Id. at 725.
255. Id. at 720. Justice O'Connor states further that this power must be
exercised without violation of the first section of the fourteenth amendment, and
that the Croson I decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that
Richmond did indeed have legal authority to establish a set-aside program, is
not disturbed by the subsequent decision of Croson II, holding that Richmond's
program violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 720 n.2.
256. Id. at 720. Justice O'Connor distinguishes the Wygant decision in that
Wygant concerned the policies of a school board, and was not "a case [such as
Croson II] involving a state entity which has state-law authority to address
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teenth amendment. 257 This enforcement power carries with it "the
power to define situations which Congress determines [to be a] threat]
[to] the principles of equality." States and their subdivisions are not
likewise authorized to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of the fourteenth amendmentY The Civil War Amendments estab-
lished limitations on the powers of the states, while at the same time
enlarging the powers of Congress. Since section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment established explicit constraints on state powers, any race-
conscious remedial actions that are taken by states are subject to those
limitations.
Richmond relied on Fullilove to lend support to its view that it had
broad authority to enact remedial legislation. 2 9  In Fullilove, the
Court found that Congress could enact race-conscious legislation based
on its broad powers to enforce the fourteenth amendment. The Court
in Fullilove also determined that when Congress enacted the Public
Works Employment Act, it had before it an ample evidentiary basis for
concluding that the federal government's procurement practices
operated to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination.2 ° These
findings, in the Court's view, authorized the set-aside provisions of the
Public Works Employment Act. In Croson, Justice O'Connor found that
unlike Congress, states and their subdivisions are not authorized to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. According to this analysis, the
fourteenth amendment contains an affirmative grant of Congressional
enforcement power and a concurrent limitation of the powers of the
states. Because of this distinction, Justice O'Connor reasoned Congress
could mandate state and local government.compliance with the set-aside
provisions under its section 5 power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. This "does not, however, mean that, a fortiori, the States and
their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are
appropriate."' Because of the fourteenth amendment's relative
257. Id. at 719.
258. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution specifies
"Congress," without any mention of the states, as having the power to enforce
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
259. Id. at 719. Justice O'Connor noted that while Fullilove could perhaps
be invoked to support Richmond's set-aside regardless of the lack of "specific
findings of discrimination," comparison between Congress and a city council (or
any state or state governmental unit) cannot ignore Congress' constitutional
mandate to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Id
260. The Fullilove Court referred to congressional investigation of statistical
evidence, including reports from the Department of Commerce: "These statistics
are not the result of random chance. The presumption must be made that past
discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities." Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 466.
261. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
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allocation of powers, Justice O'Connor found that the City of Richmond
could not rely on the holding in Fullilove to support its set-aside
ordinance.
262
4. The Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard
The most significant aspect of the Croson decision is that a majority
of the Justices agreed, for the first time, to apply the strict scrutiny
standard to the Cour's review of an affirmative action program. In
Part II of her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected the City's
claim that a lower level of scrutiny should apply to racial classifications
which have a benign or remedial purpose.2" After finding that "[tihe
Richmond plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a
fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race,"2 "4
the majority held "the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by
a particular classification."' Thus, the majority agreed, after ten
years of debate, to apply the strict scrutiny standard to an affirmative
action program.
In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor also found that even if
a lower standard of review would be appropriate in some instances,
"heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of
this case."' The circumstance to which she referred consisted of the
racial composition of Richmond and the black majority on Richmond's
City Council. In Justice O'Connor's view, the concern that a political
majority might act to disadvantage the minority population provided an
additional justification for the Court's application of strict scrutiny.0 7
262. Id. at 720. Justice O'Connor cited the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1872), for the proposition that the Civil War Amendments provided an
extension of federal powers and a restraint upon those of the individual states.
263. According to Justice O'Connor, "[t]he mere recitation of a benign or
compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially
entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial
scrutiny under § 1" Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
264. Id. at 721.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 722.
267. Id. Justice O'Connor cites to United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938), for its reference to the threat against "discrete and insular
minorities" by an indifferent or prejudiced "majority"; while the simple majority
of city council seats and approximately fifty percent of Richmond's population
is black, there is no mention of the economic power this "majority" may wield
against the "discrete and insular" white minority. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722.
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5. The City Council's Evidence of
Discrimination Was Not Adequate to Support
Race-Conscious Legislation
Justice O'Connor concluded that the city had erroneously relied on
the statistical "disparity between the percentage of prime contracts
awarded to minority firms" and the percentage of blacks in Richmond's
population as evidence of discrimination in the construction indus-
try.m Although statistical comparisons can be used to establish an
evidentiary basis for discrimination in appropriate circumstances, when
special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool must
be limited to the number of minorities who are "qualified" to undertake
the task.2' In this case, Richmond should have compared the per-
centage of qualified minority contractors in the Richmond area to the
percentage of city contracts actually awarded to 1MBEs 270
The plurality opinion also discounted the probative value of
evidence which reflected low minority membership in Richmond's
contractor associations. Justice O'Connor speculated that the dearth of
minority participation in local trade organizations could have been
attributable to several factors, including societal discrimination in
educational and economic opportunities, as well as black and white
career choices." Justice O'Connor also found that a congressional
finding of nationwide discrimination in the construction industry was
not an adequate basis for concluding that a similar degree of discrimina-
tion existed in Richmond. In her view, the waiver provisions of the
federal set-aside program in Fullilove recognized that the pervasiveness
of discrimination would vary from market to market. 2
Although finding the city's statistical evidence defective, Justice
O'Connor's opinion indicates that if there is a sufficient statistical
disparity between minority membership in trade organizations and
persons of color eligible to join such organizations, an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could be drawn. In such a case, the city would
268. Id. at 725.
269. Id. Here, Justice O'Connor refers to Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977), which states that where gross statistical
disparities may be prima facie proof of discrimination "in a proper case," where
special job qualifications are required, then the proper comparison is to those
holding the qualifications, and not to the general public. Id.
270. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725. Under this analysis, if twenty percent of the
local contracting firms were minority owned and only two percent of those firms
received city contracts, a fact finder could infer a prima facie case of discrimia-
tion.
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have a compelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from fostering
a racially segregated construction market."3 In this case, however,
Justice O'Connor concluded that "none of the evidence presented by the
city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction
industry."2 74 As a consequence, "the city ha[d] failed to demonstrate
a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities
on the basis of race."
2 75
In Part IV of her opinion, Justice O'Connor criticized the City of
Richmond's failure to explore any race-neutral means of increasing
minority participation in contractingY8 Citing her dissent in United
States v. Paradise, 1 7 Justice O'Connor argued that the efficacy of
alternative remedies should have been weighed prior to the imposition
of racial quotas. Justice O'Connor also suggested that cities should
develop race-neutral devices to enhance minority access to city contract-
ing opportunities and that they could do so without evidence of racial
discrimination. The examples she cited included "simplification of
bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements and training
and financial aid."278 Justice O'Connor also recommended the enact-
ment of measures that would prohibit discrimination in the provision of
credit or bonding by local suppliers and banks. Legislation along these
lines would enhance opportunities for minority businesses without the
use of a race-conscious criterion.
Justice O'Connor also found that Richmond's 30/0 quota was not
narrowly tailored to any legislative goal since it rested on what she
deemed to be the "completely unrealistic assumption that minorities will
choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation
in the local population."' 79 Justice O'Connor also criticized Rich-
mond's failure to consider whether any individual minority contractors
had been injured by past discrimination. 0
273. Id.
274. Id. at 727.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 728.
277. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
278. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729. Additional measures would be undertaken
to ensure no discrimination in credit and bonding; "[b]usiness as usual should
not mean business pursuant to the unthinking exclusion of certain members of
our society from its rewards." Id. at 730.
279. Id. at 728.
280. Id. at 729.
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6. Localities Can Still Act to Eliminate
the Effects of Past Discrimination
Despite her sharp rejection of the Richmond ordinance, Justice
O'Connor emphasized in Part V of her opinion that the Croson decision
does not preclude state and local governments from acting to rectify the
effects of discriminatory practices. "If the city of Richmond had
evidence before it that non-minority contractors were systematically
excluding minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities it could
take action to end the discriminatory exclusion."'21
Justice O'Connor also stated that a legitimate inference of discrim-
ination could be drawn "where there is a significant statistical disparity
between the number of qualified minority contractors" located within
the relevant geographic area and the number of MBEs actually utilized
by a city or its prime contractors. In such a case, the city could take
appropriate measures against those who discriminate on the basis of
race, but only in the "extreme case" could the use of some narrowly
tailored form of racial preference be justified.282
7. Justice Stevens' Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
O'Connor's explanation of why Richmond's ordinance could not be
justified as a remedy for past discrimination, but he did not agree with
the underlying premise "that a governmental decision that rests on a
racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past
wrong."2 3 For these reasons, Justice Stevens limited his concurrence
to Parts I, III-B, and IV of Justice O'Connor's opinion.'
In Justice Stevens' view, race is not always a bar to sound govern-
mental decision making. To support this assertion, Justice Stevens
cited, among other things, examples of a police department's use of
black undercover agents to infiltrate a group of black criminals and a
school board's decision that an integrated faculty would be more
desirable than an all-white faculty.' Since, in this case, Richmond
did not identify a compelling public interest that would be served by
granting a preference to minority owned businesses, Justice Stevens
concluded that there was no basis for suggesting that the race of a
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id at 730.
284. Id. at 731.
285. Id. (referring to his dissent in Wygant).
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contractor had any relevance to his access to the construction mar-
ket.2
86
Justice Stevens also found that the difficulties presented by
Richmond's set-aside program demonstrated that courts are better
suited than legislatures to fashion remedies for past wrongs. 7 To
support this conclusion, Justice Stevens noted that Richmond's set-aside
was over-inclusive because the class that benefitted by the set-aside
included persons who had never attempted to transact business with the
city "as well as minority contractors who may have been guilty of
discriminating against" contractors who belonged to other minority
groups.m In addition, the ordinance penalized white contractors who
may not have engaged in any racially discriminatory conduct. Justice
Stevens also warned that instead of remedying discrimination, the
ordinance would probably reinforce the stereotypical assumption that
the group granted the preference is "less qualified in some respect that
is identified-purely by their race."289
8. Justice Kennedy's Opinion
Justice Kennedy issued a separate opinion in which he concurred
with all but Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion because he could not
understand "[t]he process by which a law that is an equal protection
violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal
protection guarantee when enacted by Congress."2 ° Justice Kennedy
argued that states possess the power to remediate the effects of racial
discrimination in both the public and private sectors, and that they have
an "absolute duty" to do so when discrimination is practiced by the state
itself.2 1 In Justice Kennedy's view, the fourteenth amendment should
not be interpreted to reduce a state's authority to take steps to
eliminate public or private discrimination. Justice Kennedy also
endorsed what he deemed the "moral imperative of racial neutrality" as
the driving force of the fourteenth amendment and would strike down
286. Id.
287. Id. at 731-32. Justice Stevens notes that legislatures as policy-making
bodies have a focus towards future conduct, as opposed to the judicial role of
identification of past wrongdoers and the imposition of appropriate remedies.
Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 732-33.
289. Id. at 733 ("[A] statute of this kind is perceived by many as resting on
an assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race.") (citing
Fulllove, 448 U.S. at 454).
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all preferences which are not remedies for victims of unlawful discrimi-
nation.
292
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy would not support the adoption of
a rule which would automatically invalidate racial preferences in every
case. He agreed, however, that any racial classification should be
subject to the strict scrutiny standard. This standard, he believes,
would forbid the use of even narrowly drawn racial classifications except
as a last resort.m
Justice Kennedy contended that evidence which would support a
judicial finding of intentional discrimination by a state or a political
subdivision would also support legislative action. The Richmond ordi-
nance did not satisfy this standard because it did not adequately ex-
plore: the nature and scope of the injury; the historical causes of the
injury; the extent to which the city contributed to the injury (actively or
passively); the necessity for the response adopted; its duration in
relation to the wrong; and the precision with which it otherwise ad-
dressed discriminatory practices." 4
9. Justice Scalia's Analysis
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia concurred with most of Justice
O'Connor's views. He specifically endorsed the application of the strict
scrutiny standard even where the racial classifications have a benign or
remedial purpose. Unlike other members of the Court, Justice Scalia
does not believe that states and local governments possess the authority
to enact race-conscious legislation to "ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination." 5 Legislation which is intended to compensate for
social disadvantages resulting from prior discrimination cannot, in
Justice Scalia's view, be pursued by race-conscious means.2
The harm resulting from the classification of individuals on the
basis of their national origin or the color of their skin far outweighs, in
Justice Scalia's opinion, the goal of compensation for past discrimi-
nation. He argued that any form of racial discrimination is inherently
wrong and destructive of democratic society. Only a social emergency
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 735. In concluding that Richmond's city ordinance violated the
fourteenth amendment, Justice Kennedy seemed to view the case as one of
reverse discrimination. He stated that the ordinance and legislative record are
"open to the fair charge that it is not a remedy but is itself a preference which
will cause the same corrosive animosities" which are constitutionally forbidden
and contrary to national policy. Id.
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creating an imminent danger to life and limb could justify, in his view,
an exception to the race-neutral principles of the fourteenth amend-
ment.9 7
After acknowledging that the Supreme Court had previously
approved the use of racial classifications by the federal government to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, Justice Scalia urged the Court
to limit the application of those cases to federal legislation:
[Il]t is one thing to permit racially based conduct by the Federal
Government--whose legislative powers concerning matters of race
were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment... and quite
another to permit it by the precise entities against whose conduct in
matters of race that Amendment was specifically directed ....
Justice Scalia echoed Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the Civil
War Amendments were designed to eliminate racial oppression by
limiting the power of states to establish racial classifications, while at
the same time enlarging congressional power. Justice Scalia also
cautioned that racial discrimination against any group finds a more
ready expression at the state and local level. He noted with some irony
that Richmond's set-aside was directly beneficial to Richmond's black
citizens, a group that was then the dominant racial and political group
in that city.
29
Justice Scalia conceded that a state could enact race-conscious
legislation when it is necessary to eliminate the state's own mainte-
nance of a system of unlawful racial classification. Justice Scalia also
found that states could take actions which are designed to undo the
effects of past discrimination if the state employs a race-neutral
classification to do so. He explained that this approach would allow a
preference for small businesses "which would make it easier for those
previously excluded to enter the field."300 A race-neutral mechanism
of this sort would be permissible even when it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.3° 1 Nevertheless, in what was the most far-reaching
condemnation of the set-aside program, Justice Scalia seems to suggest
that any race-conscious legislation would be unlawful, however remedial
the purpose and irrespective of whether there is an adequate evidentia-
297. Id. at 735. Justice Scalia uses the example of a prison race riot, where
the temporary segregation of prisoners may be appropriate when failure to take
such a remedy would in all likelihood result in death or injury to the inmates.
Id.
298. Id. at 736.
299. Id. at 737.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
ry basis for the measure.
10. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in
a vitriolic dissent characterizing the plurality opinion as "a deliberate
and giant step backward in this Court's affirmative action jurispru-
dence." 2  Justice Marshall viewed the Richmond plan as virtually
identical to the federal plan upheld in Fullilove,303 yet failing Court
scrutiny by "fail[ing] to catalogue adequate findings to prove that past
discrimination has impeded minorities from joining or participating fully
in Richmond's construction contracting industry."0
4
Justice Marshall began his chastisement of the plurality deci-
sion 3°5 with an analysis of the factual record compiled and relied upon
by Richmond, a "rich trove of evidence" of discrimination that the
plurality "takes [with] an exceedingly myopic view."' He relied on
the Court's decision in Fullilove upholding the federal set-aside enacted
in the Public Works Employment Act of 1976,307 legislative history,
and congressional records of systematic discrimination in the construc-
tion industry to provide the backdrop for Richmond's local evidence; a
viewpoint which in his opinion allows for resolution of the case within
the test set forth in Bakke.30
Under Bakke, any race-conscious classifications enacted for a
remedial purpose "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives" to
302. Id. at 740.
303. Id. at 739. Justice Marshall stated that the program was "indistin-
guishable in all meaningful respects from--and in fact was patterned upon--the
federal set-aside plan which this Court upheld in Fullilove." Id. (citation
omitted).
304. Id. at 740. Justice Marshall begins his analysis by pointing out what
he considers the "deep irony in second-guessing Richmond's judgment". Id.
Later in his opinion he recites the numerous patterns and practices of racial
discrimination which permeated Richmond and did not escape earlier Court
scrutiny.
305. Justice Marshall refers to Justice O'Connor's opinion as the "majority
opinion" for the sake of convenience. Id. at 740 n.1.
306. Id. at 740. Justice Marshall maintains that the evidence of discrimi-
nation specific to Richmond must be viewed against the national record to be
"properly understood" and that the plurality's refusal to view Richmond's
appraisal of local discrimination as indicative of its consistency with nationwide
discrimination "infects its entire analysis of this case." Id.
307. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982).
308. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 742-43.
19901
63
Ware: Ware: Remedy for the Extreme Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
survive constitutional scrutiny.' Justice Marshall concluded that
Richmond had met both prongs of this test. Richmond had two interests
that meet the "governmental interest" criteria "in eradicating the effects
of past racial discrimination" 10 and a "prospective one of preventing
the city's own spending decisions from reinforcing and perpetuating the
exclusionary effects of past discrimination."' It is this second
interest, according to Justice Marshall, that the plurality discount-
ed.3' According to Justice Marshall, prior Court decisions reflect a
practical inquiry regarding whether the requisite proof is offered to
support these two interests, a standard he believes Richmond handily
met.313 Finally, Richmond meets the second step of the Bakke test as
the Minority Business Utilization Plan is substantially related to
Richmond's twin interests. Justice Marshall argued that Richmond's
plan was "appropriately limited" in duration, included a waiver provi-
sion, had limited effect on "innocent third parties" and operated prospec-
tively without interference to the "vested rights of a contractor to a
particular contract.'3 14 Justice Marshall then refuted the plurality's
contention of Richmond's lack of race-neutral measures and its thirty
percent set-aside quota.
315
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by arguing against the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review: "the [plurality] has gone beyond
the facts of this case to announce a set of principles which unnecessarily
restrict the power of governmental entities to take race-conscious
measures to redress the effects of prior discrimination." ' According
309. Id. at 743 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 744.
312. Id. Justice Marshall states that "[tihe majority pays only lip service
to this additional governmental interest" of preventing Richmond's contracting
resources from perpetuating a discriminatory situation in the construction
industry specific to the Richmond area. Id.
313. Id. at 745-50. Justice Marshall states that "to suggest that the facts on
which Richmond has relied do not provide a sound basis for its finding of past
racial discrimination simply blinks credibility." Id. at 746.
314. Id. at 750.
315. Id. at 751-52. Justice Marshall notes the virtual similarity of
Richmond's ordinance and that of the federal set-aside upheld in Fulllove,
including a limited duration, a waiver provision, minimal impact on innocent
third parties, and prospective operation without interference with any
contractor's vested rights. Id. at 750-51. He also notes that Richmond's ban
(since 1975) on discrimination has not been effective (evidenced by less that 1%
minority participation) and that race-neutral measures, "while theoretically
appealing, have been discredited by Congress as ineffectual in eradicating the
effects of past discrimination in this very industry." Id. at 751.
316. Id. at 752.
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to Marshall, the application of the strict scrutiny standard is appropri-
ate only when the actions of the governmental unit are racist, not when
the actions of government are designed to remedy past discrimination
or act as a "neutral" acquiescence to racism.311 Additionally, Justice
Marshall did not believe that the numerical majority of blacks in Rich-
mond's population and city council votes would warrant application of
the strict scrutiny standard absent a general belief in the standard."'
Finally, Justice Marshall refuted the plurality's "daunting standard"
regarding the constitutional grant of authority to the federal govern-
ment and to the states.
319
11. The Use of Statistical Evidence
to Support a Finding of Discrimination
The plurality endorsed the use of statistical evidence as a means of
identifying racial discrimination. In one of the leading employment
discrimination decisions, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,32 the Supreme Court held that statistical evidence
could be an important source of proof in employment discrimination
cases. The rationale underlying the use of statistical evidence was
explained in Teamsters. In that case, the Court found:
Absent explanation, it is ordinarily expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population
in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of long-
lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force
and that of the general population thus may be significant even
though § 703 (j) makes clear that Title VII imposes no requirement
that a work force mirror the general population."
In a later case, Hazelwood School District v. United States,3' the
Court clarified the level of proof needed in cases which rely on statistical
evidence. In Hazelwood, a district court compared the percentage of
minority teachers in the Hazelwood School District to the percentage of
minority students who attended Hazelwood's public schools to support
317. Id. Justice Marshall cites to Wygant, Fullilove, and Bakke in support
of this proposition, and implies that singular application of the strict scrutiny
standard indicates a willingness to view "racial discrimination as largely a
phenomenon of the past." Id.
318. Id. at 752-53.
319. Id. at 754-57.
320. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
321. Id. at 340 n.20.
322. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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its determination that the school district had not utilized any
discriminatory practices. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the proper comparison should have been the racial composition of
Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified
public school teacher population in the relevant labor market. The court
of appeals' approach was endorsed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Hazelwood. Assuming that the Title VII standard is the appropriate
analytical approach, Richmond should not have based its comparison
on the percentage of blacks in the general population. It should have
compared the percentage of black contractors in the Richmond area to
the percentage of City contracts that were awarded to IBEs.
It is important to note that statistical evidence is used only to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. In cases
interpreting Title VII, a prima facie case can be rebutted by the mere
"articulation" of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employ-
er's conduct. For example, in Hazelwood, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally rejected the Court of Appeals determination that the statistical
evidence involved in that case conclusively demonstrated discriminatory
hiring practices, remanding the case for additional proceedings. Thus,
despite the plurality's endorsement of statistical evidence, a state or a
city may not be able to rely solely on a statistical showing of the under-
utilization of qualified minority contractors to justify the enactment of
a set-aside ordinance. Additional evidence of actual discriminatory
practices may be needed.
Furthermore, even when there is a gross disparity between the
percentage of qualified minority contractors in the geographic area and
the percentage of city contracts awarded to minority firms or where
there is a gross disparity between the percentage of qualified minority
contractors in a particular locality and the level of minority membership
in local trade groups, these disparities might not by themselves justify
race-conscious legislation. The plurality's opinion suggests that the
remedy to these situations would be some sort of action against the indi-
viduals who are engaging in the discriminatory conduct. As Justice
O'Connor explained, when there is a sufficient statistical disparity to
infer discrimination, "the city could act to dismantle the closed business
system by taking appropriate measures against those who discriminate
on the basis of race or other illegitimate criteria."' 32 As Justice
Stevens' concurrence makes clear, this implies that a governmental
classification which rests on a racial classification is never permissible
except as a remedy for an individual wrong. Nevertheless, the plurality
conceded that "[i]n the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored
racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliber-
323. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729 (citation omitted).
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ate exclusion." 24  Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor did not describe
the circumstances that would constitute an "extreme case," nor did she
indicate what form the "narrowly tailored" legislation should take.
Justice O'Connor also indicated that localities must explore indi-
vidualized approaches when they identify discriminatory practices prior
to resorting to remedial legislation. This sort of ad hoc approach would
not achieve the goal of assuring that local MBEs receive at least some
share of the government contracts. First, as Justice Stevens indicates
in his concurrence, courts are better suited to determine liability and
fashion remedies against individual wrongdoers. Second, an ad hoc ap-
proach would be limited to the parties to the enforcement action and
would require separate civil actions for each discriminatory incident. At
best, class actions could be used in cases involving a pattern and
practice of discriminatory conduct. An individualized approach along
these lines could not remedy the type of systemic discrimination that
was identified in Fullilove. Legislatures should be free to address
broad-based problems with legislative rules of general applicability.
Since even the plurality acknowledges "that the sorry history of both
private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a
lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs,"3" localities must be
allowed the latitude to enact remedial legislation which addresses their
compelling interest in eliminating systemic discrimination.
12. Justice O'Connor's Analysis
of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Croson decision relies heavily on Justice O'Connor's analysis
of the fourteenth amendment. Without the distinction between the
relative allocation of powers to the state and federal government, it
would have been difficult to distinguish this case from Fullilove. The
Richmond set-aside program was the functional equivalent to the federal
set-aside that was approved in Fullitove. Like the Public Works
Employment Act, Richmond's set-aside ordinance required allocation of
a fixed percentage of the city's contracts to minority enterprises. Al-
though Richmond's thirty percent set-aside was twenty percent higher
than the federal statute's ten percent, the Richmond plan was not
entirely exclusionary. It assumed non-minority participation because it
required non-minority prime contractors to subcontract with minority
entrepreneurs. Hence, the legislative intent was the inclusion of a
group that suffered from historic exclusion.
Contrary to Justice O'Connor's assertion, the Richmond plan was
324. Id.
325. Id. at 724.
1990]
67
Ware: Ware: Remedy for the Extreme Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
not an "unyielding quota." Like the federal statute involved in Fulli-
love, the Richmond ordinance authorized waivers when prime contrac-
tors were unable to secure the cooperation of an MBE. In this case,
Richmond denied Croson's waiver request after a minority subcontractor
advised the procurement office that he was available to enter into a
subcontract with Croson. If a minority subcontractor had not been
available, Richmond's bidding procedures would have allowed the city
to grant Croson's waiver request. Although the Court found that there
was an adequate evidentiary basis for the set-aside in Fullilove, without
Justice O'Connor's analysis of the fourteenth amendment it would have
been difficult to conclude that the same findings would not support a
local set-aside ordinance.
Furthermore, although a majority of the Justices endorsed the
application of the strict scrutiny standard, only two Justices concurred
with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the fourteenth amendment's
allocation of power between the states and the federal government.
Justice Kennedy flatly disagreed with Justice O'Connor, because he
could not understand "[tihe process by which a law that is an equal
protection violation when enacted by a state becomes transformed into
an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress.""3 2 Further-
more, as the dissenting opinion points out, the support for this analysis
is limited to a circuit court opinion and two law review articles. Even
if it is conceded that there is an affirmative allocation of power to the
federal government and a coicurrent limitation on the powers of the
states, that does not automatically require the conclusion that a federal
action which enforces the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause
somehow becomes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when an
identical action is taken by a locality. Since a majority of the Justices
did not endorse Justice O'Connor's analysis, the extent to which the
fourteenth amendment prohibits race-conscious legislation remains
uncertain.
13. The Status of Set-Aside Programs After Croson
The plurality recommended the utilization of race-neutral devices
to enhance minority access to contracting opportunities. Justice
O'Connor found that "[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation
of bonding requirements, and training and financial aid.., would open
up the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the
effects of past societal discrimination. 3 2  Justice O'Connor also sug-
gested that cities should act to prohibit discrimination in the provision
326. Id. at 734.
327. Id. at 729.
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of credit or bonding by local suppliers and banks."
Justice Scalia, who was by far the harshest critic of the set-aside
program, also endorsed the use of race-neutral devices which would
disproportionately benefit minority entrepreneurs. He suggested that
states could "adopt a preference for small businesses, or even new
businesses-which would make it easier for those previously excluded
by discrimination to enter the field."' -9 If, as the plurality assumes,
these race-neutral approaches would enhance minority contracting
opportunities, state and local governments could adopt this approach to
avoid the threat posed by the Croson decision.
It seems doubtful, however, that this approach would do much to
assist minority entrepreneurs. An extensive federal set-aside for small
businesses has been in effect for several years. It requires each federal
agency to obtain a substantial portion of their goods and services from
small business enterprises. Moreover, there is an existing federal
statute which prohibits discrimination in the extension of credit.
Neither of these federal measures has significantly enhanced minority
contracting in the federal arena. This would seem to undermine the
plurality's assumption that race-neutral measures are an adequate
remedy to the inability of minorities to gain access to government con-
tracts.
In any event, the critical question after Croson is whether states
and their subdivisions can enact race-conscious remedial legislation
without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Croson holds that legislation of this nature will be subjected to
strict scrutiny; any race-conscious legislation must now be justified by
a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to effectuate
that interest must be narrowly tailored to the legislation's goals.
With regard to the first prong of the standard, it would appear that
states could satisfy the compelling interest requirement if they can show
that their existing procurement practices are part of a larger system
which perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. In Croson, the
plurality conceded that localities would have a compelling interest in
preventing their tax dollars from maintaining a discriminatory
marketplace.
S33
Croson makes it clear, however, that localities must establish a
sound evidentiary basis for such a finding. The Croson opinion also
indicates that this obligation could be satisfied by the use of statistical
evidence. If, for example, there is a gross statistical disparity between
the percentage of eligible MBEs in a particular locality and the per-
centage of MBEs that actually receive city contracts, a set-aside which
328. Id. at 730.
329. Id. at 738.
330. Id. at 726.
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reflects that statistical disparity might be justified. Likewise, if there
is a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of eligible
MBEs and the level of MBE membership in local trade organizations,
such a showing would provide additional support for a minority set-
aside which has a limited duration.
In addition to developing statistical evidence, localities enacting set-
aside legislation should commission studies which document the historic
exclusion of minorities from the marketplace. Testimony of witnesses
who could describe actual episodes of discrimination should be offered
to buttress the statistical evidence. It should not be impossible to
secure statements from experienced minority contractors who could
testify about their business experiences with racial discrimination and
their exclusion from local trade organizations. If it can be shown that
the existing construction industry developed in an era of racial exclu-
sion, it should not be difficult to establish a causal nexus between the
discriminatory practices and the current inability of minorities to gain
access to the marketplace.
After the locality establishes an adequate evidentiary showing of
the existence of discriminatory market forces, it must thereafter demon-
strate that race-neutral measures cannot resolve the problem. The
satisfaction of this obligation would involve the development of studies
which show that despite a twenty-five year record of anti-discrimination
legislation, minority businesses have been unable to make inroads into
the local construction market. If the locality does not already have a
small business or new business set-aside, it may be advisable to explore
legislation along these lines prior to the enactment of race-conscious
legislation. At a minimum, the locality would need to develop studies
to show that race-neutral legislation would not provide an effective
remedy.
After the locality has exhausted race-neutral alternatives or
demonstrated that these options would not result in enhanced minority
access to the marketplace, the locality could enact set-aside legislation.
At this juncture, care must be taken to assure that the set-aside is
"narrowly tailored" to achieving the legislation's goal. If the locality has
identified gross statistical discrepancies between the percentage of
qualified MBEs in the area and the percentage of MBEs who actually
receive city contracts, a set-aside which reflects that disparity would be
justified. Care should be taken to assure that the class benefitted is not
over-inclusive. If the evidence only shows the exclusion of black
entrepreneurs, the inclusion of other minorities might not be justified.
If statutory or constitutional violations are shown, the class benefitted
would not have to be restricted to the actual victims of discriminatory
practices. Similarly, if "innocent" non-minority contractors are excluded
by the set-aside, that would not mean that the class was too broadly
drawn. The duration of the set-aside should be limited and the levels
of minority participation in the provision of goods and services to the
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locality should be monitored. The goal of the set-aside would be
enhanced minority access to the marketplace. When the level of
minority participation reaches a level roughly equal to the percentage
of qualified MBEs in the geographic region, there would be no justifica-
tion for a continuation of the set-aside.
IV. CONCLUSION
After ten years of debate, the disagreement concerning the appro-
priate constitutional analysis has ended. In Croson, a majority of the
Justices agreed to apply the strict scrutiny standard to an affirmative
action plan. Race-conscious remedies employed by governmental units
must now be justified by a compelling governmental interest and the
means chosen must be narrowly tailored to achieving the classification's
goals. The elimination of discriminatory practices or the lingering
effects of past discrimination, however, will constitute a compelling state
interest as long as there is an adequate evidentiary predicate for
making this determination. Furthermore, if Justice O'Connor's views
prevail, the factual predicate can be satisfied by a showing of gross
statistical disparities.
If a compelling justification is shown, a determination of whether
the means chosen is narrowly tailored involves consideration of: (a) the
efficacy of alternative remedies; (b) the duration of the remedy; (c) the
impact of the remedy on "innocent" third parties; and (d) the scope of
the class benefitted. If these considerations are satisfied, a race-
conscious remedy can be justified.
The decision in Croson does not affect affirmative action programs
developed by private employers nor does it prohibit courts from ordering
race-conscious relief. If there is a statistically significant imbalance in
an employer's workforce compared to the percentage of minorities or
females in the geographic area, an affirmative action plan can be
justified and the program would serve as a defense to claims of reverse
discrimination.
Beneath the majority's decision in Croson lies an unstated as-
sumption that race-neutral remedies will almost always provide an
adequate remedy for racial discrimination. As Justice O'Connor
suggests in Croson, only in the "extreme case" would a race-conscious
remedy be justified. Racial discrimination did not end, however, with
the enactment of the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960's. The Court's
own decisions in cases such as United States v. Paradise and Local 28
of the Sheetmetal Worker's International Association u. EEOC show just
how deeply entrenched racial discrimination can be, as well as how
intransigent some employers have been. Furthermore, the Congres-
sional findings cited in Fullilove clearly establish that statutory
proscriptions against racial discrimination will not by themselves
1990]
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eliminate the vestiges of practices which resulted from an elaborate
system of state sanctioned discrimination. Affirmative action is an
equitable means of effectuating the transition from a deeply rooted
system of discrimination to the colorblind goals of the Equal Protection
Clause. There are, however, far more "extreme cases" than the majority
seems to realize. In cases involving longstanding or systemic discrimin-
ation, race-conscious remedies will likely prove to be the only effective
means of dismantling the vestiges of a segregated society even when the
stringent standard of Croson is applied.
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